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ABSTRACT 
The world is on the verge of a dramatic shift in security relations in Northeast 
Asia.  With a “rising China” and a Japan emerging as a “normal” military power by 
revising the pacifist clause of its constitution (Article 9), many analysts argue that the 
new century may bring with it increased instability to the region.  With this forecast in 
mind, this thesis explores how the United States should approach a militarily 
“normalizing” Japan.   
The primary questions that will be analyzed are:  1) Will the current ad hoc 
movement towards the revision of Article 9 (Renunciation of War Clause) be the impetus 
for a downward security spiral in Northeast Asia? 2) What should U.S. policy be towards 
the revision of Article 9? and 3) Should the United States push for further 
“normalization” and burden sharing in security relations?   
This thesis concludes that in order to ameliorate the security tensions in the region 
that are arising from the ad hoc revision of Japanese Article 9, the United States should 
implement three policy prescriptions which will increase the transparency and the time 
horizon associated with this dramatic shift in Japan’s military restraints.  The first policy 
recommendation is that the United States should use its influence to encourage Japan to 
hold off revision of Article 9 until the 75th anniversary of the document’s enactment (3 
May 2022).  Second, to minimize Japan’s need to re-militarize, the United States should 
maintain its current force levels in the region leading up to the 2022 transition in order to 
provide continued stability in the region.  Lastly, the United States should push for 
greater burden sharing by the Japanese; however, it should focus on a greater utilization 
of Japan’s ability to project “soft power.”  Execution of these policy recommendations 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
No man is entitled to the blessings of freedom unless he be vigilant in its preservation. 
-Douglas MacArthur, 19481 
Very few observers of post-World War II Japan would have predicted that a 
constitution produced by a conquering enemy, and which took little over a week to write, 
would sixty years later remain unchanged.  Many had predicted—including the 
constitution’s authors—that as soon as the country was freed from the shackles of 
American occupation, its words would quickly be revised.2  However, much to the 
surprise of those forecasters, the Japanese constitution has not been modified, while its 
accomplice in aggression, Germany, has revised its Basic Laws (constitution) forty times 
since 1947.3  Nearly sixty years since the Japanese document’s inception, it still breeds 
internal controversy and regional anxiety.  At the core of these problems is the potential 
modification of Article 9 of the constitution (The Renunciation of War Clause), which 
reads: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The 
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.4 
The seventy-three simple words of this statement of peace have had a profound effect on 
Japan’s foreign affairs and its internal and external security. 
                                                 
1 Douglas MacArthur, “No man is entitled to the blessings of freedom unless he be vigilant in its 
preservation”  (speech to the people of Japan, May 3, 1948, upon the first anniversary of the Japanese 
Constitution). Douglas MacArthur, Vorin E. Whan, and United States Military Academy. Dept. of Military 
Art and Engineering, A Soldier Speaks; Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army, Douglas 
MacArthur. Prepared for the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y. (New York: Praeger, 1965), 194. 
2  Harold S. Quigley, "Japan's Constitutions: 1890 and 1947," The American Political Science Review 
41, no. 5 (October. 1947): 869.  
3  Mayumi Itoh, "Japanese Constitutional Revision: A Neo-Liberal Proposal for Article 9 in 
Comparative Perspective," Asian Survey 41, no. 2 (March - April. 2001): 311.  
4 Japanese Constitution, Article 9. 
2 
Within the last decade, there has been an escalating drive by conservatives and, 
surprisingly, a growing number of those traditionally considered to be on the left, to 
revise the wording of Article 9.  Both groups increasingly support the position that 
revision is essential to provide Japan with the legal foundation to assume a larger role in 
international affairs.  Many within the debate believe that revision is an essential step on 
the road towards the return of “normal nation” status and is long overdue.  Ichiro Ozawa, 
a prominent Japanese politician, popularized the term “normal nation” in the mid-1990s.  
Ozawa states,  
What is a “normal nation”? First, it is a nation that willingly shoulders 
those responsibilities regarded as natural in the international community.  
It does not refuse such burdens on account of domestic political 
difficulties.  Nor does it take action unwillingly as a result of 
“international pressure.”…A second requirement of a “normal nation” is 
that it cooperate fully with other nations in their efforts to build prosperous 
and stable lives for their people. …Japan must satisfy these two conditions 
if it is to go beyond simply creating and distributing domestic wealth and 
become what the world community recognizes as a “normal nation.”5 
These aspirations towards “normalcy” may seem innocuous on their own.  However, 
Japan does not exist in a security vacuum.  Therefore, it is essential to analyze what a 
militarily “normal” Japan would mean for Northeast Asia and the United States.6 
The world is on the verge of a dramatic shift in security relations.  With a rising 
China and a Japan emerging as a “normal” military power, many analysts argue that the 
new century may bring with it increased instability in East Asia.7   With this forecast in 
mind, this thesis will explore how the United States should approach a “normalizing” 
Japan.  The primary questions that will be analyzed are:  1) Will the current ad hoc 
movement towards the revision of Article 9 (Renunciation of War) be the impetus for a 
downward security spiral in Northeast Asia? 2) How will Japan’s neighbors react to 
revision of Article 9? 3) What should U.S. policy be towards the revision of Article 9? 
                                                 
5 Ozawa Ichiro, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation, ed. Eric Gower, trans. Louisa 
Rubinfien, (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994), 94-95. 
6 For the purposes of this thesis, my causal logic is as follows: “normalization” equals revision of 
Article 9, which equals greater Japanese involvement in regional and world security affairs.  
7  Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," in 
International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, eds. John G. Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno 
(New York: Columbia University, 2003), 25.  
3 
and 4) Should the United States push for further “normalization” and burden sharing in 
security relations? 
In order to develop several concluding policy recommendations, Chapter II of this 
thesis provides a brief history of:  1) adoption and interpretation of Article 9; 2) 
establishment of the JSDF (Japanese Self-Defense Force); 3) a review of the modern 
debate concerning the revision of Article 9—specifically, why there has been an 
increased push for revision and what those recommended changes entail; and 4) a brief 
overview of the U.S. position on the matter.  The Chapters III and IV will examine the 
potential regional concerns and responses to the revision of Article 9.  In particular, this 
study will survey Northeast Asian responses:  South Korea, North Korea, and China.   
Finally, this thesis will conclude by providing three policy recommendations that, 
if implemented, will help minimize the potential for increased regional instability and 
downward security spirals in the region.  The first policy recommendation is that the 
United States should use its influence to encourage Japan to hold off revision of Article 9 
until the 75th anniversary of the document’s enactment (3 May 2022).  Second, to 
minimize Japan’s need to re-militarize, the United States should maintain its current force 
levels in the region leading up to the 2022 transition in order to provide continued 
stability in the region.  Lastly, the United States should push for greater burden sharing 
by the Japanese; however, it should focus on a greater utilization of Japan’s ability to 
project “soft power.”  Implementation of these three policy recommendations will help to 
ameliorate the security tensions in the region that are arising from the ad hoc revision of 
Article 9 by increasing the transparency and the time horizon associated with this 
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II. THE FOUNDING OF A PACIFIST NATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
For a Japanese nation that had been at war for almost two decades, the widely 
accepted adoption of a peace amendment in its constitution was a profound change.  
However, with the Emperor’s surrender on 15 August 1945, it was clear that a once great 
warrior nation was ready for peace and a change in state policy.  Therefore, whether their 
acceptance and maintenance of such an accord was due to the unconditional defeat they 
suffered at the hands of the Americans or because of the return of society to civilian 
control is debatable and will be addressed later.  However, my focus in the first part of 
this chapter is on the history surrounding the adoption of Article 9, specifically:  1) its 
origination in the Potsdam Declaration; 2) General Douglas MacArthur’s and his 
staff’s—Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAPs)—intentions; 3) the Japanese 
response; and 4) the changing tide in U.S. policy.  The second portion of this chapter 
provides a brief history on the development of the Self-Defense Force (SDF) after the 
constitution was established:  1) its origination; 2) the legal backlash and issues 
surrounding constitutional interpretation; 3) the gradual increase in its role and 
assertiveness; and 4) an examination of the growing SDF capabilities and procurement 
initiatives since the early 1990s.  Next, this examination will analyze the ongoing 
domestic debate on the revision of Article 9.  Finally, this chapter will close by providing 
a brief overview of the U.S. position on the matter. 
B. HISTORY OF ARTICLE 9 
The inception of Article 9 dates back to before the end of World War II.  In the 
words of Charles Kades, one of its authors, “on 26 July [1945], Truman and Attlee, with 
the concurrence of the absent Chiang Kai-Shek—but without that of Stalin, because the 
USSR had not yet entered the war against Japan—set forth their terms for the surrender 
of Japan in the awesome document known as the Potsdam Declaration.”8 Specifically, 
point twelve of the Declaration states, “The occupying forces of the Allies shall be 
withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has 
                                                 
8  Charles L. Kades, "The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution," Political Science 
Quarterly 104, no. 2 (Summer 1989): 217.  
6 
been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a 
peacefully inclined and responsible government.”9 
Building on this language and sentiment, General MacArthur and his staff at 
SCAP drafted a constitution founded on peace and non-aggression.  The penmen of 
Article 9 at first intended to place the “Renunciation of War” clause in the preamble, but 
in order to give it more emphasis, it instead was written as its own article.  Many 
historians argue about who originated this clause and, when asked, MacArthur alluded to 
his Japanese counterpart as its originator.10  Courtney Whitney, who was chief deputy in 
charge of the government section of the SCAP and a close personal friend of 
MacArthur’s, in his book MacArthur, His Rendezvous with History describes the 
origination of Article 9 as follows: 
…Prime Minister Sidehara, after expressing his thanks for the penicillin, 
had proposed that when the new constitution was drafted, it contain an 
article renouncing war and the maintenance of a military establishment 
once and for all.  By this means, Shidehara had said, Japan could 
safeguard itself against the re-emergence of militarism and police 
terrorism and at the same time offer convincing proof even to the most 
skeptic of the free world that Japan intended to pursue a future course of 
pacifism.  Shidehara further pointed out that only if relieved from the 
oppressive burden of military expenditures could Japan have the slightest 
chance of providing the minimum necessities for its expanding population, 
now that all its overseas resources were gone.  It was this that they had 
discussed for two and one-half hours.  Shidehara’s private secretary, Mr. 
Kuramatsu Kishi, has since thrown further light on Shidehara’s views by 
stating that he had held them for a long time before communicating with 
MacArthur.11 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the Philippines—another country that 
MacArthur assisted in the writing of its constitution—had a similar clause.  Alternatively, 
                                                 
9 Potsdam Declaration, 1945, Japanese National Diet Library. 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html (accessed May 2006). 
10 Justin Williams, Sr., Japan’s Political Revolution under MacArthur, A Participant’s Account 
(Athens:  University of Georgia Press, 1979); Robert E. Ward, “The Origins of the Present Japanese 
Constitution,” The American Political Science Review 50, no. 4 (December 1956); Theodore H. McNelly, 
“‘Induced Revolution’: The Policy and Process of Constitutional Reform in Japan,” Democratizing Japan: 
The Allied Occupation, eds. Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1987). 
11 Courtney Whitney, MacArthur:  His Rendezvous with History, (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 
1956), 258. 
7 
perhaps what one sees are two leaders so thoroughly affected by the destruction of war 
that they both envisioned and hoped for a perpetually peaceful Japan.  No one will ever 
know for sure whether the impetus for Article 9 was a Japanese or American idea, but the 
above comments by Major General Courtney, a first hand participant in its conception, 
gives strong credibility to those who say it was purely a Japanese creation.  Yet, the fact 
that remains is that sixty years after its inception, the Japanese people have been 
unwilling to amend it.  This largely has been due to the pacifist sentiment of society, a 
focus on economic recovery over military expansion, and the “rigidness” of the 
constitution established by Article 96. Therefore, those politicians who would have 
revised Article 9 earlier have not been permitted to do so because popular support would 
not have passed such a stringent amendment process.  Article 96 requires that in order to 
amend the constitution, there must be a two-thirds majority vote in both houses and, 
subsequently, the revision must receive majority support by popular referendum for 
ratification.12  To this date, despite Prime Minister Koizumi’s persistence, the Japanese 
people have yet to be presented with a referendum.13 
The Japanese response to, and acceptance of, the constitution is important to 
examine because many of the decisions made by the country’s leaders sixty years ago are 
affecting their contemporaries today.  With regards to Article 9, during the initial drafting 
period in 1946, the Japanese government’s Diet representative on constitutional revision, 
Hitoshi Ashida, had only two distinct changes from the initial version presented by 
SCAP, “…one preceding the first sentence of Article 9: ‘Aspiring sincerely to an 
international peace based on justice and order….’ The other preceding the second 
sentence of that article read: ‘For the above purpose….’”14 The overall effect of these 
changes, which later became known as the Ashida amendment, was that they left greater 
room for future interpretation.15  In the words of Theodore H. McNelly, 
                                                 
12  Nobuaki Hanaoka, "The Long Road to Amending the 1947 Constitution," Japan Echo 32, no. 4 
(August 2005): 30.  
13  Ibid.: 30.  
14  Kades, "The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution," 236.  
15  Osamu Nishi, "Bringing Article 9 into the Twenty-First Century," Japan Echo 32, no. 4 (August 
2005): 36.  
8 
Paragraph 1 of Article 9 as amended may be interpreted to mean that war 
and the threat or use of force are renounced only as a means of settling 
international disputes.  War and force might therefore be permissible for 
self-defense.  The phrase at the beginning of paragraph 2, ‘in order to 
accomplish the aim if the preceding paragraph,’ could be interpreted as 
qualifying the renunciation of land, sea, and air forces.  Thus, although 
armaments for settling international disputes are banned, armaments for 
other purposes, such as self-defense, are not renounced. 16 
The second significant event during the infancy of Article 9 was its interpretation by 
Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, which would eventually come to be called the “Yoshida 
Doctrine.”  Under pressure from the United States to rearm with the outbreak of the Cold 
War, Yoshida focused on the establishment of a minimal military force and looked to 
economic growth as the key to Japan’s success.17  Because of Yoshida’s belief in the 
need to be a “mercantile state,” he was more than willing to forgo military strength and, 
thus, trade some of his foreign policy autonomy for U.S. protection.18  In essence, what 
came to be known as the Yoshida doctrine was founded on two overarching principles—
resistance to military buildup and a focus on post-war economic recovery.  The first 
principle was institutionalized with the adoption of Article 9 and the U.S.-Japan Mutual 
Security Treaty, in which Washington guaranteed Japan’s security in exchange for basing 
rights.  Therefore, Yoshida legally ensured that Japan would be able to focus on 
economic recovery.  Regionally, the Yoshida Doctrine had a reassuring effect on Japan’s 
neighbors and assisted in the stabilization of the region. 
It is interesting to note that less than five years after the United States had 
authored a peace constitution for the people of Japan, Washington was pushing for its 
remilitarization.  As mentioned above, with the onset of the Korean War and the broader 
Cold War, the United States reconsidered its position on Japanese rearmament and 
thought it more important to focus on the utility of having a geo-strategic partner on the 
Soviet and Chinese flank.  This period saw the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty 
                                                 
16 McNelly, “Induced Revolution,” 92-93. 
17 Interestingly, “Yoshida himself in later life came to regret the course that he had set.” For more on 
this subject see: Michael B. Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 2nd and revised. 
(London; New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004). 
18 William W. Grimes, "Institutionalized Inertia: Japanese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War 
World," in International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, eds. John G. Ikenberry and Michael 
Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University, 2003), 363. 
9 
and, as a stipulation within, the creation of the National Japanese Police Reserve.  
However, in an attempt to stay within the confines of Article 9, the “self-defense” force 
could not exercise the right of collective self-defense.  Walking a fine line to avoid labels 
of remilitarization and to maintain the integrity of Article 9, Tokyo and Washington 
avoided overt military reemergence.  Whether the United States meant Article 9 to be this 
restrictive is debatable.  In the words of Charles L. Kades, one of the primary drafters of 
the Japanese constitution, “In recasting Point II of the MacArthur/Whitney Notes into a 
form suitable for inclusion in the model for a constitution, I had omitted the phrase ‘even 
for preserving its own security’ from the sentence in which Japan renounced war.  I 
believed it was unrealistic to ban a nation from exercising its inherent right of self-
preservation.”19  In contrast, when asked why Japan did not expressly reserve the right of 
self-defense, Yoshida replied, “Of late years most wars have been waged in the name of 
self-defense.”20 
C. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SDF 
With the onset of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, the future Japanese Self 
Defense Force (SDF) was born.  It was commissioned as the National Police Reserve in 
late 1950, two years later, in 1952, it was renamed the National Safety Forces, and 
finally, in 1954, it was reorganized as today’s SDF.21  The establishment of a national 
security force was not solely due to the Korean War.  With the commencement of the 
Cold War and the fall of China to communism, the United States and Yoshida believed 
that it would also be a beneficial tool for suppressing the rise of communism in Japan.  
After Yoshida re-established a nominal military force, many attempted to test the legality 
of his decision.  In 1957, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Yoshida’s policy and found that 
the constitution “was not intended to render Japan defenseless or incapable of 
resistance….”22  Building on its legal and political legitimacy and weakening pacifist 
                                                 
19  Kades, "The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution," 236.  
20  Ibid.: 237.   
21  Hanaoka, "The Long Road to Amending the 1947 Constitution," 29. 
22  Shotaro Hamura and Eric Shiu, "Renunciation of War as a Universal Principle of Mankind: A Look 
at the Gulf War and the Japanese Constitution," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 44, no. 2 
(April. 1995): 434.  
10 
sentiment, the SDF has gradually increased its role and assertiveness over the last fifty-
five years. 
Central to Japan’s security policy over the last half-century has been its alliance 
with the United States.  Beginning in the 1950s with the commencement of the Cold War, 
Japan quickly became the most important spoke in the U.S. wagon wheel of Far East 
security.23  The history of the U.S.-Japan security relationship centers on four key events:  
first, the original 1952 bilateral security treaty that provided for an exchange between 
basing rights and inclusion in the security umbrella; second, the 1960 revision of that 
treaty; third, the 1978 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation; and fourth, the 1997 revised 
Guidelines for Defense Cooperation.  The most recent rendition of the security alliance—
the 1997 agreement—has drawn attention from its neighbors because of its ambiguous 
language concerning Japan’s participation in a Taiwan unification scenario. 
A second factor that has had an impact on Japan’s emergence as a strong 
“defensive” power since the establishment of the SDF has been its “miraculous” 
economic growth.  As shown in Table 1, despite a policy of limiting defense expenditures 
to 1% of its GDP, it has produced a highly technical and modern defense force due to its 
rapid economic growth.  In 2005, Japan had the fourth largest military budget (in U.S. 
dollars) in the world.  However, when ranked by percent of GDP, it is one hundred and 
thirty-fourth.24 
 
Year Yen millions US$ millions % GNP % annual govt exp. 
1975 1,327.3 4,484 0.84 6.23 
1976 1,512.4 5,058 0.90 6.22 
1977 1,690.6 6,100 0.88 5.93 
1978 1,901.0 8,570 0.90 5.54 
1979 2,094.5 10,080 0.90 5.43 
1980 2,230.2 8,960 0.90 5.24 
1981 2,400.0 11,500 0.91 5.24 
                                                 
23 Hub and Spoke security analogy drawn from the work of John G. Ikenberry, “American Hegemony 
and East Asian Order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3 (September 2004): 353-
367. 
24 “Rank Order - Military Expenditures - Dollar Figure,” The World Factbook, CIA, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2067rank.html (accessed May 2006); “Rank Order 
- Military Expenditures - Percent of GDP,” The World Factbook, CIA, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2034rank.html (accessed May 2006). 
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1982 2,934.6 10,360 0.93 5.21 
1983 2,754.2 11,617 0.98 5.47 
1984 2,934.6 12,018 0.99 5.80 
1985 3,137.1 14,189 1.00 5.98 
1986 3,343.5 20,930 0.93 6.18 
1987 3,5174.4 25,420 1.00 6.50 
1988 3,700.3 28,850 1.01 6.53 
1989 3,919.8 30,090 1.01 6.49 
1990 4,159.3 28,122 1.00 6.28 
1991 4,386.0 32,890 0.95 6.23 
1992 4,551.8 34,300 0.94 6.41 
1993 4,640.6 39,710 0.94 6.41 
1994 4,683.5 42,100 0.96 6.41 
1995 4,723.6 53,800 0.96 6.65 
1996 4,845.5 45,100 0.98 6.45 
1997 4,941.4 42,900 0.96 6.39 
1998 4,929.0 35,200 0.95 6.35 
1999 4,920.1 41,100 0.99 6.01 
2000 4,921.8 45,600 0.99 5.79 
2001 4,938.8 40,400 0.95 5.98 
2002 4,939.5 39,500 1.00 6.08 
2003 4926.5 41600 0.99 6.02 
2004 4876.4 45151 0.97 5.94 
Table 1.   Japan’s Defense expenditure 1975-2004 calculated in yen and US dollars, 
and as a percentage of GNP and annual government expenditure25 
 
The watershed event that has led to Japan’s increasing emergence as an 
internationally engaged security provider was when it received criticism for its “check 
book diplomacy” during the 1991 Gulf War.  Despite its tremendous financial 
contribution to the war effort—some 13 billion dollars—Kuwait failed to acknowledge 
Japan’s support in ending the conflict.  The impact that this event had on Japan is clear if 
one looks at its response to the criticism.  In particular, the Japanese Diet passed the 
International Peace Cooperation Law on 15 June 1992.  The adoption of such an 
internationalist policy was a major step for Tokyo towards a more active role in world 
and regional security affairs.  However, to limit their exposure to UN world-policing 
efforts, they stipulated five conditions that must be met before they would commit forces 
                                                 
25Asagumo Shimbunsha, Boei Handobukku (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, various years); 
Internaional Institutes for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
relevant years) in Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Re-Emergence as a "Normal" Military Power, Vol. 
368–9 (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 
2004), 77. 
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to peacekeeping operations.  Those conditions are:  1) a cease-fire had been reached; 2) 
consent from all parties; 3) strict impartiality; 4) if any of the above three conditions 
change, the Japanese can withdraw their forces; and 5) use of weapons is limited to the 
self-defense of Japanese forces.26  The adoption of this Law on Cooperation has led to 
Japan’s participation in a series of peacekeeping and reconstruction operations 
throughout the world, for example:  Cambodia 1992; Mozambique 1993; Rwanda 1993; 
and Iraq 2004. 
In addition to their increasing security role in the UN through peacekeeping and 
Reconstruction Operations, within their home waters, observers have seen a much more 
assertive Japanese SDF.  Eugene Matthews, in the December 2003 issue of Foreign 
Affairs, provides an excellent description of one of Japan’s most provocative encounters: 
The mystery ship did not respond to hails and fired on Japanese ships 
when they approached.  In response, the Japanese decided to give chase.  
After an extended pursuit deep into Chinese waters, Japanese patrol boats 
opened fire on the intruder with heavy machine guns.  The fleeing craft—
which turned out to be a North Korean spy ship, bearing no fishing 
equipment of any kind—caught fire and sank, killing its Korean crew.27  
This type of encounter would have been unthinkable just ten years ago, but today there 
seems to be a growing acceptance of the need for increased military autonomy and 
capability.  The Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2005 provides a useful synopsis of this 
evolving Japanese military: 
…Japan’s own security approach is undergoing a significant evolution, 
with changes in policy, force planning, and the country’s role in regional 
security codified in the issuance of a major revision of the Naional 
Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) on December 10, 2004.  Japan’s 
changing external role was most dramatically illustrated by the dispatch of 
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) personnel to Iraq in January 2004, marking the 
first time the SDF had been sent to an area ‘where combat ha[d] not 
completely ceased.’ In security terms, Japan is increasingly assuming the 
status of a “normal nation.”28 
                                                 
26  Hamura and Shiu, "Renunciation of War as a Universal Principle,” 428.  
27  Eugene A. Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (November/December 
2003): 74.  
28 Richard W. Baker and others, Asia Pacific Security Outlook, 2005 (Tokyo; New York: Japan Center 
for International Exchange, 2005), 96. 
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Japan’s military hardware procurement has been increasing in correspondence with their 
assertiveness.  According to the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), the 
enhancement of defense capabilities is a priority.29  For example, the MSDF is in the 
procurement and delivery phase for the 14,700 ton, helicopter capable Osumi class LST 
amphibious ships, the 16 DDH helicopter carriers, and more Aegis destroyers.  In 
addition, in 2004 the SDF requested and was approved $1.2 billion for Ballistic Missile 
Defense, an amount that was nine times the total spent on similar projects between 1999 
and 2003.30  Finally, “in a move already creating considerable stir in surrounding 
countries, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) announced a plan for Japan to rapidly 
procure independent strike capability, in the form of cruise missiles or precision air-to-
surface munitions (JDAM) to further deter the North Koreans.”31  Specifically, the JDA’s 
Defense of Japan 2004 white paper states, “…in the JFY 2004 budget, it has been 
decided to acquire a precision guidance device (to be added to existing conventional 
bombs) which can guide the bomb accurately to a preset target by receiving a signal from 
a GPS (Global Positioning System) satellite after the bomb is released.”32  This decision, 
combined with the concurrent rapid development of an air refueling capability, has more 
than just North Korea concerned over the pattern of development.  These military 
hardware developments, along with the latest LDP initiative to raise the Japanese 
Defense Agency to the ministry level and to rename the SDF as the Self-Defense 
Military, has regional neighbors wondering how far it will go. 
To conclude, from the inception of the post-war constitution, the nature of 
Japanese security—from post-war protectorate to internationally and regionally active 
security participant—and the forces—from police force to the most modern military force 
in Asia—that it would take to provide it has been a point of contention both domestically 
                                                 
29 Defense of Japan 2004 in Japanese July 06, 2004 translated by FBIS July 06, 2004, 
JPP20040713000058. 
30 Eugene A. Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism," 75. 
31William E. Rapp, Paths Diverging? : The Next Decade in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004), 39; “Japan ASDF Seeks Budget 
for Precision Bombing System,” JiJi Press, August 30, 2003 in FBIS August 30, 2003, 
JPP20030830000035; “Japan threatens force against N Korea,” BBC News World Edition, February 14, 
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2757923.stm (accessed May 2006). 
32 “Defense of Japan 2004.” 
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and internationally.  With the establishment of the SDF in 1954 and the gradual rise in its 
capabilities and stature over the last decade, the world is left wondering, “What is next?” 
D. THE ONGOING DEBATE 
There are two concurrent debates concerning the revision of the constitution:  
whether or not to revise it, in general; and whether or not specifically to revise Article 9.  
This section will provide a brief overview of the latter debate in three parts:  1) by laying 
out the arguments concerning the amendment of Article 9; 2) by using polling data to 
demonstrate the shift in popular and legislative attitudes towards revision; and 3) by 
briefly exploring why the desire for change exists. 
Prominent Japanese politicians differ significantly on whether or not to revise 
Article 9.  In the words of former LDP Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa: 
But the attitudes of these nations toward Japan might also change if Japan 
were to decide to amend its Constitution—especially Article 9—and alter 
its defense policy.  We do not want to do anything that would arouse 
antagonism or suspicion among our neighbors.  I believe it is unwise to try 
to revise the Constitution because of the predictable damage such change 
would do to our international relations.33 
In rebuttal, former LDP Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone states:  
Some worry that revision of Article 9 would make China, the DPRK 
(North Korea) and the ROK (South Korea) and other neighboring 
countries wary of Japan.  With the present Constitution as it is, however, 
these neighboring countries are even more suspicious of Japan, and this 
could easily escalate into friction.34 
The differing opinions of these two former Prime Ministers demonstrate that this issue 
will not be easily solved and that it has left Japanese society divided.  This division and 
debate became increasingly evident during the 2006 Constitution Day celebrations.  
Across Japan there were rallies calling for the preservation of Article 9 and groups who 
label themselves as “defenders,” such as the Article 9 Association, have seen significant 
                                                 
33  Kiichi Miyazawa, "Rethinking the Constitution (2)--A Document Tested by Time," Japan 
Quarterly 44, no. 3 (July-September 1997): 10. Miyazawa was Prime Minister from November 91 to 
August 93, LDP, first elected to the house of Councilors in 1953 served eleven terms. 
34  Yasuhiro Nakasone, "Rethinking the Constitution (1)--make it a Japanese Document," Japan 
Quarterly 44, no. 3 (July-September 1997): 6.  Nakasone was Prime Minister of Japan from November 
1982 to October 1987, LDP, first elected to the House of Representatives in 1947, and at the time of 
publication was serving in his nineteenth term. 
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rises in “grass-roots groups supporting the association’s cause.35  Finally, as this thesis 
will demonstrate in Chapters III and IV, Prime Minister Nakasone’s belief, that if the 
constitutional review process is “sufficiently open and candid, Japan will win the 
confidence of other nations,” has credence and should be taken under strong 
consideration.36  More recently, 
Former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, who has hinted at his 
intention to run in the LDP leadership race, takes a negative stance on 
revising the Constitution hastily, although he was involved in the the 
party's process to devise a draft, as subpanel chairman of the party's 
constitutional revision committee.  
In a lecture in Tokyo on March 25, Fukuda said, "Revisions should be 
made after Japan's situation is correctly understood." "It must be done very 
cautiously," he added.37 
Fukuda’s comments are important because it is just another demonstration that even 
within the LDP there not a consensus on how constitutional reform should proceed.  The 
final recommendations of this thesis are founded on the above principles of transparency 
and positive iterative interaction. 
Amongst the Japanese public, there has been a rising trend in support for revision 
of Article 9. “The April 8 [2005] edition of the Yomiuri Shimbun reported the results of 
an opinion poll in which 60.8% of respondents expressed support for revising the 
constitution, the second year in a row that the survey has found more than 60% support 
for reform.”38  In an effort to account for biases that may exist in the above statistics, in 
2005, two other polls received lower but similar numbers–54% for Nihon Keizai Shimbun 
and 48% for NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation).39  However, as suggested at the 
beginning of this chapter, the key lies in the wording of the question.  All of the above 
polls asked if they support revising the constitution without any mention of Article 9.  An 
                                                 
35 Yu Yoshitake and Mayuko Tokita, “Nationwide rallies debate major changes to peace 
Constitution,” Asashi Shimbun, May 04, 2006; “Grass-roots defenders of Article 9 on the rise,” Asashi 
Shimbun, May 03, 2006. 
36 Yasuhiro Nakasone, "Rethinking the Constitution,” 6. 
37 Shinichi Murao and Shozo Nakayama, “Debates on Constitution May Intensify,” The Daily 
Yomiuri, May 04, 2006 in FBIS May 03, 2006, JPP20060503969027. 
38  Nishi, "Bringing Article 9 into the Twenty-First Century," 36.  
39  Ibid.: 36. 
16 
excellent example of the biases associated with Japan’s daily newspapers is that on April 
04, 2006 the Yomiuri Shimbun published an article entitled “71% Want Constitution To 
Clarify SDF Existence.”  However, when one looks deeper into the article, one will find 
that only 39% of respondents thought that Article 9 should be rewritten.40  An underlying 
intent to spur support for revision of Article 9 is clearly evident in the Yomiuri’s headline.  
In addition, a street survey scheduled to coincide with the celebration of the 2006 
Constitution Day found that, of a sample size of 28,169 respondents, 21,652 or 77% were 
against any type of revision to Article 9.41   Moreover, a poll conducted by Asahi 
Shimbun during the same time frame found that overall 42% of respondents said neither 
paragraph of Article 9 should be revised, and those supporting revision were split three 
ways depending on which clause would and would not be amended.42  “In the Diet, as 
with the general public, support for revising Article 9 is lower—30 percent for clause 1 
(the renunciation of war) and 43 percent for Clause 2 (the renunciation of war 
potential).”43  As mentioned in section one of this chapter, it would take two-thirds 
majority support in the Diet to revise Article 9, that is unless reformers first change 
Article 96 and decrease the “rigidity” of the requirement.  Despite the lower support for 
the revision of Article 9, there certainly has been an increase in overall acceptance of its 
eventual revision, as evident in the increased frequency of discussion on the matter at the 
highest levels of government.  Keeping with their stated intention, in November 2005—
coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the LDP’s founding—the party released their draft 
revision of the constitution and Article 9. The LDPs proposed revision of Article 9 reads 
as follows, 
(Pacifism) Article 9 Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on 
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign 
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling 
international disputes. 
                                                 
40 "71% Want Constitution To Clarify SDF Existence," Yomiuri Shimbun, April 04, 2006 in FBIS 
April 04, 2006, JPP20060403044001. 
41 “Overwhelming Majority of Pollees Oppose Constitutional Revision,” Kyodo World Service, May 
03, 2006 in FBIS May 03, 2006, JPP20060503969021. 
42 “Survey: 62% want SDF acknowledged,” Asashi Shimbun, May 04, 2006, 
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200605040088.html (accessed May 2006). 
43  Robert Pekkanen and Ellis S. Krauss, "Japan's ‘Coalition of the Willing" on Security Policies,’ 
Orbis 49, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 442. 
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(Military forces for self-defense) Article 9 (2) In order to secure peace and 
the independence of our country as well as the security of the state and the 
people, military forces for self-defense shall be maintained with the prime 
minister of the Cabinet as the supreme commander. 
The military forces for self-defense, in implementing activities to deliver 
duties provided for under the preceding paragraph, shall in accordance 
with law subjugate themselves to the Diet and other authorities. 
Aside from implementing duties stipulated in the first paragraph, the 
military forces for self-defense may engage in activities conducted in 
international cooperation to secure peace and security of the international 
community as well as in activities to maintain public order in emergencies 
or to protect freedom or the lives of the people. 
Aside from what is stipulated in the preceding two paragraphs, matters 
relating to the organization and control of the military forces for self-
defense shall be determined by law. 44 
The two most dramatic changes from the original document are its direct 
acknowledgement of the right to maintain standing military forces for self-defense and its 
declaration that those self-defense forces can participate in “activities conducted in 
international cooperation,” or in other words, collective self defense.  Yet, even within 
the ruling coalition, the New Komeito has pledged to fight the LDP’s proposed changes 
and will submit their own draft in late 2006.  The New Komeito’s draft will maintain 
both parts of the current Article 9. 
There are numerous reasons for the increased support to revise Article 9 of the 
constitution.  This section will quickly examine a few.  Mayumi Itoh provides an 
excellent synthesis of what has changed: 
The question is what changed the Japanese attitude toward the 
constitution.  Three major factors caused the change: first, Japan’s 
growing economic position in the world; second, the Japanese realization 
of its emerging role in international society; and third, the U.S. pressure on 
                                                 
44 Shin Kenpou Seitei Suishin Honbu (Liberal Democratic Party's Center to Promote Enactment of a 
New Constitution website). http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/shin_kenpou/shiryou/pdf/051122_a.pdf, (accessed 
May 2006). Shin Kenpou Sou-an, Draft New Constitution. As released by the Liberal Democratic Party in 
Japanese.  English Translation of Pre-Amble and Article 9, “Translation of Preamble, Article 9 of LDP 
Draft Constitution,” Kyodo News, October 28, 2005 in FBIS October 28, 2005, JPP20051028969085. 
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Japan to increase its “burden sharing” in the maintenance of international 
security.45 
More specifically, the majority of the reasons people and politicians cite to revise Article 
9 can be placed into three categories:  1) desires to “normalize;” 2) autonomy from U.S. 
policies; and 3) increased international engagement.  Finally, Prime Minister Koizumi is 
one of the main reasons why the reform movement recently is getting such popular 
support.  As Christian Caryl puts it, “At the center of the revision movement is Koizumi 
himself, who has publicly declared his intention to alter Article 9 so that it will define a 
clear legal basis for the existence and role of the nation’s military.”46  While Koizumi is 
in office, constitutional revision will surely remain of high importance; however, only 
time will tell if it will stay a priority once his term of office is completed. 
E. UNITED STATES POSITION ON THE DEBATE 
This final section will survey the pre-existing U.S. position on the revision of 
Article 9.  From John Foster Dulles to today’s presidential administration, the United 
States has continually pushed Japan to increase their security burden sharing, specifically, 
in the arena of collective defense.47  This U.S. objective appears to be evident in the 
initial push to re-establish a military force in 1950 and in each rendition of the U.S.-Japan 
security treaty.  In addition, the most recent “2+2 U.S.-Japan security dialogue” has gone 
so far as to include a declaratory statement on the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
Straits issue.48  In 2000, the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National 
Defense University published a report on the future of the U.S.-Japan security 
relationship.  The report stated that a lack of Japanese commitment to collective defense 
                                                 
45  Mayumi Itoh, Globalization of Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and U.S. Efforts to Open Japan, 
1st ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 152.  
46  Christian Caryl, With Hideko Takayama, and Kay Itoi, "Law of the Land; as Soporific as it 
Sounds, the Challenge of Reforming the Country's Constitution is Getting Japanese Excited." Newsweek 
(February 7 2005): 30.  
47  Jihwan Hwang, "Rethinking the East Asian Balance of Power: Historical Antagonism, Internal 
Balancing, and the Korean-Japanese Security Relationship," World Affairs 166, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 100.  
Rust M. Deming, "The Changing American Government Perspectives on the Missions and Strategic Focus 
of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," in The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia, eds. Michael H 
Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto (Stanford University: Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2004), 52. 
48 See Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Washington, DC, February 19, 
2005, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-
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is a significant hindrance to the security alliance.49  “Many in Tokyo interpreted this as 
an endorsement of constitutional revision.  However, the report was careful to emphasize 
that decisions on the constitution must be thoroughly considered by the Japanese people 
themselves.”50  Finally, the U.S. position on the revision of Article 9 became quite clear 
when on August 14, 2004, 
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell on Thursday said Japan will have to 
‘examine’ war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution if it wants a 
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. ‘We understand 
the importance of Article 9 to the Japanese people and why it's in your 
Constitution,’ he said in an interview with The Asahi Shimbun and other 
Japanese media representatives here.  ‘But at the same time, if Japan is 
going to play a full role on the world stage and become a full active 
participating member of the Security Council and have the kinds of 
obligations that it would pick up as a (council) member, then Article 9 
would have to be examined in that light.51  
Consistent with previous U.S. presidential administrations, Bush has continued to push 
for increased burden sharing in the maintenance of regional stability. 
F. SUMMARY   
In summary, as this chapter has demonstrated, there is a heated debate in Japan 
concerning the revision of Article 9.  While there is increasing support for revision of the 
constitution, there is still a great deal of ground to cover before both the country and the 
region—as will be discussed in Chapters III and IV—are ready for a “normal” Japan.  In 
addition, despite the constitutional provision that “…land, sea, and air forces, as well as 
other war potential, will never be maintained,” Japan’s “defense” force has emerged as 
one of the most capable in the world.  Finally, while many within the United States may 
believe that it would be beneficial for Japan to assume a greater role in regional security 
affairs, as Chapters III and IV will demonstrate, this movement toward a “normal” 
military may have a mixed response from regional neighbors. 
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III. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND REVISION OF ARTICLE 
9 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Last year (2005) marked the sixtieth anniversary of the end of Sino-Japanese 
military conflict.  However, despite growing economic interdependence and cooperation 
since 1945, diplomatic relations have been “hot and cold.”  In particular, since 2001, 
there has been a downward trend in diplomatic relations between these two East Asian 
powers.  On the surface, it appears that the tension exists, in large part, due to the 
controversial behavior of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.  However, 
observers of Asian affairs should not be deceived.  The issues that divide the most 
populous country and the wealthiest country in East Asia have been simmering since 25 
July 1894 when Captain Togo fired upon and sank the Chinese troop transport Kowshing, 
killing all 1,100 soldiers onboard.52   
With the defeat of Japan in 1945 by allied powers and the imposition of a peace 
constitution, Beijing came to see the maintenance of Article 9 as a “demarcation line” 
between regional aggressor and amenable neighbor.  To better understand China’s 
reaction to Japanese revision of Article 9, the first half of this chapter will examine 
Beijing’s approach to this regional predicament in two parts.  First, this chapter will 
assess how various interests and factors have each driven Beijing’s approach.  In 
particular, it will focus on territorial integrity and national sovereignty, economic 
interdependence, access to export markets and resources, regional stability, the U.S.-
Japan security alliance, and historical revisionism.  Second, it will show how Beijing’s 
solution to this perceived problem has been to oppose, balance, and divide.   
The second half of this chapter will explore what Japan’s likely response will be 
to Beijing’s ongoing efforts to moderate its movement towards the revision of Article 9 
and a more prominent role in Northeast Asian security.  Based on the analysis of China’s 
approach the chapter will address a number of questions.  What will likely be Japan’s 
reaction?  Will Japan take steps to reassure its neighbors that a recurrence of what 
                                                 
52 Eugene B. Canfield, "All Signs Pointed to Pearl Harbor," Naval History 18, no. 6 (December 2004): 
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happened in East Asia in the first-half of the twentieth century will not repeat itself?  Or, 
will Japan respond with bold defiance in the face of Chinese criticism and accusation?  
Broadly defined, there are three possible responses from Japan:  1) moderation; 2) status 
quo; and 3) open defiance.  This chapter will argue that the first is most likely, but each 
will be discussed in turn.  Finally, this chapter will close by evaluating the prospect of 
Beijing succeeding, Japan’s probable response, and options available to the United States 
to ameliorate the growing tensions between these two important neighbors. 
B. CHINESE INTERESTS AND FACTORS 
The interests and factors that drive Beijing’s approach to the problem of the 
revision of Article 9 are significant and diverse.  This section will explore the top four of 
these in order of their relative importance to the Chinese regime:  1) territorial integrity 
and national sovereignty; 2) Japanese historical revisionism as it aids domestic 
nationalism; 3); economic concerns— regional stability, interdependence, and access to 
export markets and resources; and 4) the U.S.-Japan security alliance.     
Due, in large part, to China’s recent history of subjugation by imperial powers, 
territorial integrity and state sovereignty is at the forefront of Beijing’s foreign policy.  
Within Sino-Japanese relations, there are two points of contention concerning territorial 
disputes and sovereignty:  1) the Pinnacle Islands (called the Senkaku Islands by Japan 
and the Diaoyu Islands by China); and 2) Taiwan.  In the words of Linus Hagström, 
“…academic accounts as well as official sources treat the Pinnacle Islands dispute as one 
of the most burning matters in Sino-Japanese relations and even in East Asian politics at 
large….”53  In addition, the common belief is that these types of disputes are the most 
likely to drive the two countries to war.  An indication of the importance that Beijing 
places on these two factors is evident in the laws it has passed to protect their sovereignty 
against Japanese intrusion.  Concerning the Pinnacle Islands, in February 1992, Beijing 
passed the Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and, in March 2005, the third 
conference of the 10th National People's Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law 
directed at Taiwan.  For Beijing, the prospect of the revision of Article 9 is just one more 
indication of a growing Japanese willingness to be militarily assertive in the region.  
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These fears are not completely unfounded; in the latest iteration of the U.S.-Japan 
security alliance, Japan has taken an unprecedented stance on the peaceful resolution of 
the Taiwan issue.54  “Immediately after the declaration, a spokesperson for the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry said in a statement, ‘the Chinese government and its people oppose’ the 
security agreement between Japan and the United States… describing it as an intrusion 
by Japan and the United States into China's internal affairs.”55  As was Beijing’s concern, 
the declaration has had the effect of bolstering Taiwanese independence factions, who 
were “…relieved that Japan has become more assertive."56   
Beijing’s concern over Article 9 relates to national sovereignty in that it fears that, 
with a remilitarized and legally recognized Japanese defense force, Tokyo will be more 
aggressive in protecting and or asserting its claims to the disputed Pinnacle Islands.  In 
addition, it is likely that Beijing understands that, despite continued reinterpretation of 
Article 9 over the last half-century, it still stands in the way of Japan becoming a full-
fledged military partner of the United States.57  Thus, Article 9 is still important because 
it impedes Japan’s ability to interfere in a Taiwan Straits crisis. 
The factor that receives the most press and diplomatic rhetoric is Beijing’s 
concern about Japanese historical amnesia.  There are two aspects of its concern that are 
important to this analysis:   its use of the “history card” as a tool to moderate Japanese 
behavior; and its exploitation of anti-Japanese xenophobia to enhance Chinese 
nationalism.  Concerning the first point, in response to the LDP’s promulgation of its 
draft constitution, the Xinhua news agency released the following statement,  
The international community, especially the Asian countries, earnestly 
hopes Japan will remember the catastrophe its aggressive war has brought 
to its people and the peoples in other Asian countries, and respect and 
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safeguard the current pacifist constitution so as to ensure lasting peace in 
Asia.58 
In general, Beijing has attempted to use complaints about Japan’s revisionist history to 
moderate its behavior.  As Denny Roy states in his article “Stirring Samurai, 
Disapproving Dragon:  Japan’s Growing Security Activity and Sino-Japan Relations,” 
“As the Japanese are well aware, the Chinese government has an interest in exploiting the 
historical guilt issue to wring additional economic aid out of Tokyo and to undermine 
Japan’s potential growth in military power and regional leadership.”59  In addition, in his 
book Chinese Policy Priorities and Their Implications for the United States, Robert G. 
Sutter observes the same phenomenon,   
…Chinese government-supported media and other outlets have used 
accusations of Japanese militarism as a way to build nationalistic feeling 
in China, to put the Japanese government of the defensive, and to elicit 
concessions from the Japanese government in the form of aid, trading 
terms, or other benefits.60 
In fact, it has become painfully obvious to the Japanese that Beijing will quickly 
set history aside if it becomes disadvantageous to its approach.  This is evident in China’s 
effort to keep the political and economic functional lines separate from one another.  On 
the one hand, Beijing wants to politically isolate Japan for its non-remorseful, ahistorical 
behavior.  Yet on the other hand, as stated above, it does not want this political banter to 
interfere with its economic relationship.  If “history” were truly the great issue that China 
makes it out to be, then logic would follow that it would use whatever means necessary to 
deal with the problem.  However, this has not been the case and, therefore, it discredits 
Beijing’s political maneuvering on the “history” issue.  This phenomenon has become 
increasingly evident to Japanese politicians “according to Singapore's ‘Lienho Zaobao’ 
newspaper, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura openly said Japan will no 
longer ‘submit itself to China's wishes in whatever he does’ because of its invasion of 
China during World War II and that now is the time for Japan to develop ‘more equal’ 
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diplomatic relations with China.”61  Therefore, in summary, the “history card” in the past 
has worked to moderate Japanese behavior. However, as of late, there is a growing 
determination by the Japanese to disregard its use.  The second factor that contributes to 
the exploitation of “history” by Beijing is its usefulness in encouraging domestic 
nationalism in order to enhance regime legitimacy.  In the words of Robert G. Sutter, “In 
the case of China, the government has gone out of its way to stoke the fires of 
nationalism, in part as a way to fill the ideological void created by the failure of 
communism.”62  With the 1978 economic reforms, and further economic liberalization 
since, the ideological legitimacy of the CCP has suffered a serious blow.   In an effort to 
shore up its legitimacy, it has replaced communist ideological backing with nationalism, 
as Yinan He so astutely states,  
Beijing’s move was based on a rational calculation that the tasks of 
enhancing internal cohesion and boosting regime legitimacy were more 
pressing that maintaining harmonious relations with Western countries. To 
this end, the Chinese government promoted an official nationalism that 
was centered on not class struggle, but self-other conflict with foreign 
countries.63 
Finally, it is important to note that China’s use of anti-Japan centered nationalism has 
also limited Beijing’s ability to pursue a flexible foreign policy.  Peter Hays Gries 
thoroughly chronicles the rise and hijacking of foreign policy by “popular nationalists” in 
his article “China’s ‘New Thinking’ on Japan.”64  This rise in domestic, increasingly 
Internet-based, nationalism will be an issue that is prevalent in China’s foreign policy 
until the regime finds its legitimacy through another vehicle—perhaps liberal democratic 
institutions.    
The third most important group of interests and factors that shapes Beijing’s 
approach to the revision of Article 9 by the Japanese centers around China’s current and 
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potential economic growth.  Specifically, regional stability, economic interdependence, 
and access to export markets and resources are of primary concern.  In 2005, the total 
trade value between China and Japan reached USD 189.3 billion, and estimates for 2006 
predict that it will top USD 200 billion.  The importance of this relationship is reflected 
in the fact that in 2004 China became Japan’s number one trading partner, surpassing the 
United States.  Therefore, Beijing’s anxiety is that if Japan continues to move further 
towards becoming a “normal nation” by revising Article 9 of its pacifist constitution, then 
there will be a growing likelihood of Tokyo becoming more assertive, which could in 
turn affect: 1) economic relations; 2) access to each other’s markets; and 3) regional 
stability.  During this period of rapid development for China, the last thing it wants is to 
disrupt its dramatic growth pattern.  For example, according to the Hong Kong 
newspaper Ta Kung Pao, “the Chinese side does not want a cooling down of economic 
and trade relations with Japan like the stalemate in political relations.”65  In addition, 
Beijing may be concerned that revision of Article 9 will strengthen an already powerful 
Japanese navy, the Maritime Self Defense Force, which could more easily allow it to 
interrupt Chinese sea lines of communication, thereby interfering with its access to export 
markets and inbound resources.  Finally, the belief that increasing Japanese assertiveness 
will affect regional stability is evident in Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu 
Jianchao’s comments on 24 November 2005, "[Japanese] adherence to the path of 
peaceful development serves the fundamental interests of Japan itself as well as the peace 
and stability in this region."66            
The final factor in order of relative importance to Beijing concerning the revision 
of Article 9 is the impact that it may have on the U.S.-Japan security alliance.67  It is 
feared that once Japan modifies its constitution to participate in collective security—even 
though it claims it will only do so in self-defense—the probability of Japan participating 
in U.S. joint action to constrain China is more likely.  For example, Japan’s recent 
collaboration with the United States on the Taiwan Strait issue is breaking down barriers 
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once considered taboo and bringing about accusations from Beijing that the Sino-
Japanese Joint Statement of 1972—the “1972 system”—and the 1978 Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship have grown to be but hollow documents in the face of Japanese 
“normalcy.”68  In the past, Beijing has viewed the U.S.-Japan security alliance with 
ambivalence.  However, with Tokyo’s increased assertiveness and a growing U.S. 
military presence around China’s borders, the alliance is increasingly being seen as a 
mechanism to contain China.  Further, its usefulness as a check on Japanese military 
expansion has all but faded.  Beijing publicized its concern on this issue in an article 
entitled “U.S. Pushing Japan To Boost Military Role,” in which it stated, “with its own 
military spread thin, Washington appears to be trying to use the talks [2+2] to nudge 
Japan out from under the U.S. security blanket and make Tokyo a much more active 
player in global strategic operations.”69  The next section will examine Japan’s response 
to the Chinese efforts outlined above.   
C. CHINA’S APPROACH 
Beijing’s approach to the problem of the revision of Article 9 is similar to the 
approach it has used in regards to other issues, such as:  visits by Japanese Prime 
Ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine war memorial, history textbook revisions, and military 
expansion.  In general, Beijing has attempted to oppose, balance, and divide in response 
to these foreign policy problems.  There are two prominent goals that this approach has 
tried to achieve:  1) to moderate what is perceived as Japanese extreme behavior; and 2) 
“…[to] prevent a resurgence of the Japanese armed forces that would give Japan the 
capability to harm, challenge or coerce China by military means….”70 
1.  Oppose 
The most visible aspect of Beijing’s approach has been its effort to “oppose” what 
it perceives as Japanese “remilitarization.”  The state-run news sources in China provide 
a strong indication of the importance of this matter,  
[The] People’s Daily asserted that the Peace Constitution, which 
renounces war forever along with Japan’s right to retain armed forces, 
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‘represents a demarcation line,’ and noted that ‘once the demarcation line 
is broken through,’ there will be reason to worry that Japan will move 
toward remilitarization.71   
Beijing is very careful to cloak its concern about Article 9 in an historical context.  
Nevertheless, as any student of Sino-Japanese relations knows, history can be set aside if 
China so desires.  As Yinan He states, 
…for a long time Chinese leaders sought strategic cooperation with Japan 
and swept the memory problem under the carpet until the early 1980s 
when they felt increasingly insecure about their domestic power status and 
policy implementation.  In order to strengthen national cohesion and divert 
public resentment away from domestic issues, the government painted a 
dark image of Japan by openly challenging Japanese historical attitude in 
diplomatic arena and promoting patriotic history at home.72 
A similar “setting aside” of history was evident in an earlier period:  when Beijing and 
Tokyo normalized relations in 1972, China did not demand reparations or an official 
apology for the atrocities that it had committed during the war.73  It is unlikely within the 
political environment that exists today that Beijing would so readily set aside the 
“history” issue. 
One of the channels that Beijing has utilized to address the issue of Japanese 
revision of Article 9—or as Beijing would say, “remilitarization”—has been to oppose its 
bid for a permanent UNSC seat.  China justifies its opposition due to Japan’s historical 
amnesia but, in reality, one can suspect that Beijing does not want to lose the influence it 
has as the only Asian nation permanently on the Security Council.  China has grown 
accustomed to using the UN to build relationships with other countries by supporting 
their interests; for example, it opposed interventions in Sudan and Iran, two of the major 
oil exporters to China.  Beijing is apprehensive about Japan obtaining a permanent UNSC 
seat because it believes that it will undercut some of its influence.  Thus, Beijing stands in 
direct opposition to Washington’s following position.  “On August 13, 2004, Secretary of 
State Colin Powell stated boldly in Tokyo that if Japan ever hoped to become a 
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permanent member of the UN Security Council it would first have to get rid of its pacifist 
Constitution.”74  Taken alone, this comment does not seem too brazen.  But if one takes 
into account earlier comments made by his deputy Richard Armitage, Powell’s position 
appears as a concerted effort to encourage Japan to revise Article 9.  Japanese newspaper 
Asashi Shimbun chronicled this effort,   
Powell's comment, which follows a similar remark in late July by his 
deputy, Richard Armitage, suggested that hopes are growing within the 
administration of President George W. Bush for a revision of Japan's 
Constitution.  While Powell emphasized his respect for the will of the 
Japanese, Armitage was more blunt, telling a Liberal Democratic Party 
lawmaker Article 9 stands in the way of strengthening the Japan-U.S. 
alliance.75So far, Beijing’s efforts to block Japan’s UNSC bids have been 
successful, but they have not been effective at stopping a growing movement towards the 
revision of Article 9.76 
A second instrument that Beijing has used to address, in particular, the revision of 
Article 9 and, in general, its fears of Japan’s remilitarization have been domestic protest.  
The evidence does not exist to substantiate a claim that the government actually instigates 
protests, but its intentions become clear according to how it handles each incident.  In 
April of 2005, there were massive anti-Japanese protests throughout China, and it is 
telling when Xinhua news states that “the police attempted to dissuade the demonstrators, 
but to no avail.”77  In this case, one can interpret the word “dissuade” to mean “did 
nothing.”  A February 2006 Congressional Research Service Issue Brief came to a similar 
conclusion, “many observers noted that the Chinese authorities were unusually passive in 
allowing the protesters to organize, fueling speculation that Beijing quietly encouraged 
the demonstrations.”78  Beijing skillfully uses domestic protest over Japan’s behavior to 
strengthen its foreign policy positions and promote domestic nationalism. However, as 
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analyzed in the above section, there has been a growth in Internet-based nationalism that 
likely helped to drive this protest further than Beijing had intended it to go.79 
2. Balance 
The second underlying maneuver in Beijing’s approach is that it has used 
“balancing” tactics in a discrete manner in the hopes of eliciting a desired response, 
however being mindful not to let this political tactic interfere or spillover into Sino-
Japanese economic relations.  This concern for the impact politics might have on 
economic relations can be observed in the following excerpt from Hong Kong’s Ta Kung 
Pao newspaper,  
China was enraged at his action and cancelled the fourth round of 
negotiations [on the joint development of resources in the East China Sea] 
that should have held in October this year.  On the other hand, 
negotiations on promoting Sino-Japanese relations of economic 
partnership will still be held in November as scheduled….This has fully 
demonstrated that the Chinese side will not "let economic relations 
deteriorate with the cooling of political relations," and shows China's 
sincerity to consolidate a microeconomic foundation [wei guan jing ji ji 
chu] in its relations with Japan.80 
Concerning its balancing strategy, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao 
in March of last year [2005] said, "As Japan's neighbour, China sincerely hopes that 
Japan should conscientiously draw its lessons, give due considerations to the concerns of 
Asian countries which it had invaded in World War II.  China hopes that it should be 
prudent in making any revision relating to the military security.”81  Beijing has 
consistently approached the problem of the revision of Article 9 as one that concerns the 
entire region.  However, aside from Japan’s immediate neighbors in Northeast Asia, the 
other countries of the region—such as the ASEAN block, Singapore, and Taiwan—have 
not voiced such heartfelt concern.  For example, by couching this problem as a regional 
one, China is attempting to sway the alignment or “regional order” in its favor by creating 
a dividing line between the once oppressed and the non-repentant oppressor.  Therefore, 
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it is not surprising that Beijing has consistently protested against provocative Japanese 
behavior in terms of its impact on “neighboring countries,” “Asian neighbors,” or “the 
international community.”82  During a meeting between Prime Minister Koizumi and 
President Hu Jintao at the Asian-African Summit in Jakarta, President Hu reiterated this 
“party line” when he said, “…such deeds by Japan had hurt deeply the feelings of the 
Chinese people and peoples of other Asian nations, and had aroused discontent among 
them.”83  This strategy would be important to Beijing because perhaps it believes the 
region will be more amenable to Chinese efforts to build the China-ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (FTA) by 2010 if China is successful in stigmatizing Japan as a non-remorseful 
aggressor and China as the maintainer of peace and stability in the region.84 
One instrument that China uses to balance against Japan is diplomatic rhetoric.  In 
an effort to isolate it from the international community, Beijing is quick to identify 
Tokyo’s actions as abominations to accepted statecraft.  By labeling Japan as a non-
remorseful World War II aggressor, Beijing can build its own influence throughout the 
world, especially with other “Third World” countries that have experienced the bondage 
of imperialism.  In addition, it provides common ground for China and the Koreas to 
oppose Japanese regional expansion.   
3. Divide 
Finally, the last facet of Beijing’s approach is to divide Japan from the United 
States whenever possible.  This is similar to the “wedge strategy” the United States used 
to create tension between China and the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War.85  This 
tactic is evident in Beijing’s attempt to play the role of an “honest broker” in the Six 
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Party Talks.  Its approach is in stark contrast to the hawkish position of the United States.  
By demonstrating the U.S. inability to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, China is 
demonstrating its position as a regional peacemaker.  Thus, it can be argued that both 
Japan and Korea would prefer a Chinese-guided peace on the peninsula to a U.S.-shaped 
conflict.  A second example of this tactic is Beijing’s policy of not devaluating its 
currency in response to the Asian financial crisis.  In the words of Hongying Wang, 
Despite the self-interest in resisting devaluation, China’s position has won 
high praise internationally….Chinese leaders have repeatedly contrasted 
China’s willingness to take risks an pay a price for the region’s stability 
with Japan’s reluctance to use its economic strength to the same end.86 
Beijing’s tactic of driving a wedge between Japan and the other major economies of the 
world, particularly the United States, and stigmatizing Tokyo as an inwardly focused 
regional actor, has had its intended effect.  The success of this strategy is evident in 
President Clinton’s remarks at a June 1998 news conference in Beijing with Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin, 
I think that China has shown great statesmanship and strength in making a 
strong contribution to the stability not only of the Chinese people and their 
economy but the entire region by maintaining the value of its currency.…I 
think that what we have agreed to do is to continue to do whatever we can 
to promote stability and to support policies within Japan that will restore 
confidence in the economy, get investment going again, and get growth 
going.…We are not the only actors in this drama, and a lot of this must be 
done by the Japanese Government and the Japanese people. We can be 
supportive, but they have to make the right decisions.87 
One can see in President Clinton’s comments exactly what Beijing had hoped for—praise 
of China and criticism of Japan.   
However, due to the horrific events of 11 September 2001 and the bond that has 
developed between Prime Minister Koizumi and U.S. President Bush, the relationship 
between Japan and the United States is far too strong to be affected.  In particular, the 
fifth meeting of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in June 2004 addressed 
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this very issue when they said, “If the alliance is rock solid, the Chinese will unlikely set 
themselves on a collision course with us.”88  Nevertheless, the Chinese may reason that it 
will not be long before these “kindred spirits” have left office and the opportunity to 
insert a “wedge” may reappear.   
D. POSSIBLE JAPANESE RESPONSES 
In the words of Tomohiko Taniguchi, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institute, 
“In geostrategic terms, the Pacific Ocean has become narrower and the East China Sea 
much wider.”89  The new millennium has clearly brought increased tension to this 
ancient neighborhood of Northeast Asia.  As chronicled in the first half of this chapter, 
China is increasingly apprehensive about Japanese movement towards revision of Article 
9 and what appears to be a move to claim greater regional and world importance with the 
assistance of the United States.  Now that the foundation of China’s approach towards 
this perceived problem has been examined, next this chapter will assess three possible 
Japanese responses:  1) moderation; 2) status quo; and 3) open defiance.   
One possible response by the Japanese would be to acknowledge the concerns of 
arguably its most important neighbor and to moderate its rhetoric and movement across 
the aforementioned “demarcation line.”  In Japan’s recent history, this would have been 
the most likely course of action that Tokyo would follow.  For example, beginning in 
1975 with Takeo Miki, prime ministers resumed the practice of visiting the Yasukuni 
Shrine90 and, in the early 1980s, Nakasone Yasuhiro paid homage at the sacred Shinto 
temple, which raised strong protests both domestically and internationally.  In response to 
this outcry from its neighbors, Nakasone cancelled plans for a second visit.91  This is just 
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one example where political pressure from China and others has had its intended effect of 
moderating Japanese behavior.  However, two and a half decades have changed many 
things, including the level of public support concerning this type of regionally 
provocative behavior.  As McCargo states in his book Contemporary Japan, 
The gradual decline of a pro-China ‘old guard’ in the LDP and the 
bureaucracy (especially the Foreign Ministry) allowed tensions between 
the two countries on a range of bilateral issues to become more 
apparent.92 
Today, Prime Minister Koizumi has made his mark on Japanese politics by openly 
disregarding requests by regional neighbors to cease this type of activity.  In addition, if 
his ability to dissolve the Diet and reestablish his coalition even stronger than before is 
any indication, public support for such flamboyant behavior is growing.  Yet despite the 
domestic political currency that these strong signals provide, with growing economic 
interdependence between these two Northeast Asian neighbors, this controversial 
behavior could come at a dramatic fiscal cost.  Moreover, given the last fifteen years of 
almost economic stagnation, this prognosis is something Japan can ill afford.  
Considering this, one might predict that Japan would moderate its behavior in response to 
Chinese protests simply to ensure that the economic relationship is not affected.   
Besides the economic factor, domestically there remains a strong pacifist 
coalition.  One such group is the “Article 9 Association,” of which members, such as 
Mikiko Miki, who experienced first hand the death and destruction that came with a 
strong military and a “normal” constitution, will adamantly impress upon whomever will 
listen the necessity of maintaining Japan as a pacifist nation.93  Nevertheless, as analyzed 
in Chapter II, the trend line in polling data over the last two decades shows that this 
hardcore pacifist belief appears to be waning across Japanese society.  Moreover, the 
current administration has shown no signs of moderating its behavior. 
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The second response that Japan could pursue is to simply maintain the status quo 
concerning Article 9 and its attempts at a greater regional and international security role.  
The status quo would be defined as maintaining the pacifist constitution as is and moving 
gradually towards greater regional security burden sharing with the United States.  Denny 
Roy believes that this will be the most likely scenario with one important caveat: 
The most likely outcome for the foreseeable future, absent an external 
security shock that could speed up the process, is continued gradual 
expansion of Japan’s security activity, with Japan’s armed forces 
participating in additional regional security activities (including joint 
exercises, multilateral dialogue, and certain joint operations).94 
This response is not as amenable as moderating its behavior through pull-back and 
restitution, but it would not exacerbate tensions as quickly as a position of open defiance 
would.  However, from a realist standpoint, over the long term such a policy would have 
its costs also.  As China continues to grow in wealth and military strength over the next 
few decades, Japan will find that it will become increasingly difficult to achieve what it 
perceives as its rightful place in the international community.  In addition, as China’s 
influence in the region and the world continues to grow, in the future, Japan will be faced 
with a much more powerful and assertive Chinese protest to what it perceives as Japanese 
“remilitarization.”  If China does “reshape the regional order,” as some predict,95 Japan 
could see its legacy as an “incomplete superpower”96 continuously perpetuated. 
The third possible response the Japanese might have to the Chinese attempts at 
moderating its behavior would be open defiance.  As stated earlier, barring any security 
shocks, this response is the least likely.  However, as conventional wisdom predicts, 
“when things start moving in Japan, they tend to do so rather rapidly.”97  The U.S. 
possible “pull-back” from the region may have a profound impact on Japan’s need to 
quickly establish itself as a regional military force to be reckoned with.  This leads to 
apprehension in Beijing that some sort of virtual hand-off from Washington to Tokyo 
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will take place.  In particular, Beijing may already be witnessing the beginnings of this 
“hand-off” in the recent 2+2 agreements.  For the first time since the end of World War 
II, Japan took an official stance with the United States on the Taiwan Straits crisis.  In 
February 2005, Japan and the United States issued a joint statement that included “a 
peaceful resolution of issues on the Taiwan Strait through dialogue” as a strategic goal.98  
The United States has been attempting to coax Japan out of its pacifist economically 
focused “shell” for the last five decades and it appears that, recently, Washington has 
found a willing participant--much to the consternation of Beijing.  Therefore, both 
Beijing and Washington will influence the possibility of Japan responding to China’s 
foreign policy approach with open defiance.   
In summary, there are three general paths that Japan could take in response to 
Chinese attempts to moderate its behavior concerning the revision of Article 9 and its 
attempts to play a more assertive role in Northeast Asia.  The possible Japanese responses 
are:  1) moderation; 2) status quo; and 3) open defiance.  Based on the current geo-
strategic situation, Japan will most likely maintain the status quo.  However, the 
possibility of a world event, such as a large-scale terrorist attack or a North Korean 
accidental or intentional missile strike on Japan, accelerating this process should not be 
ruled out.  In addition, despite Japan’s status quo tendency, Beijing is still extremely 
concerned about this trend in Japanese foreign and domestic politics.  In the final section 
of this chapter, I will explore the prospects for Beijing’s success and options available to 
the United States to ameliorate the growing tensions between these two important 
neighbors.    
E. PROSPECTS 
Beijing’s approach—balance, divide, and oppose—to the issue of Japanese 
revision of Article 9 will slow down the LDP’s efforts in the short term.  However, over 
the long term, it is improbable that China will be able to stop the growing acceptance of 
its revision.  With each passing year of Chinese growth and North Korean belligerency, 
those who advocate constitutional revision gain more followers.   
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In summary, Beijing may have legitimate concerns regarding:  territorial integrity 
and national sovereignty; economic interdependence; access to export markets and 
resources; regional stability; the U.S.-Japan security alliance; and historical revisionism.  
And Beijing’s use of UNSC seat opposition, domestic protest, and diplomatic rhetoric 
may have slowed the process of Article 9 revision by fueling pro-constitution anti-
revision groups in Japan, such as the Article 9 Association.  Nevertheless, barring any 
dramatic world events, a gradual movement towards revision is inevitable.  However, 
Beijing will continue to attempt to affect the revision that is adopted through its use of the 
“history card,” despite the fact that “the Japanese have become less inclined to passively 
accept criticism from abroad; [and that] they are more disposed to launch verbal and 
other kinds of counterattacks.”99  Hayes goes on to show that this change in attitude is 
increasingly evident in Japan’s willingness to criticize the United States for its economic 
shortcomings.100  As an aside, the instrument that Beijing has not yet used in its battle for 
Japanese moderation may very well be the most powerful.  Economic coercion has been 
purposefully absent from Beijing’s efforts, primarily because, at this point in history, they 
have more to lose than Japan.101  However, in the future, this balance may shift and, at 
that point, China may find it advantageous to begin to tie Japanese desired responses to 
economic incentives.   
Finally, a powerful determinant in Japan’s decision to revise Article 9 and assume 
a greater role in regional security will inevitably be U.S. policy choices and actions.  If 
the United States reduces its military presence in the region, as some would like, Japan 
will likely attempt to fill the gap left by the U.S. exodus.  This may take place on its own 
or come as an intentional handoff of regional security responsibilities from Washington 
to Tokyo.  In the near term, the United States should avoid increasing Japan’s hard power 
“burden” for regional security.  Instead, the United States would be better served by 
focusing on Japan’s ability to project “soft power” because it can serve in a 
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complementary role to American hard power and would be more amenable to both its 
populace and its regional neighbors.  An increase in Japanese use of hard power in the 
current regional security environment will have the likely effect of instigating downward 
security spirals.  By instead focusing on Japan’s comparative advantage in projecting 
“soft power,” the United States can achieve a more holistic security alliance in Northeast 
Asia.  In addition, Japanese use of “soft power” will bode well with its traditional policy 
of comprehensive security.  Due to the lack of transparency, both in Beijing and in 
Tokyo, the region is on the edge of a possible arms race.  Both countries question the 
other’s military intentions and believe that its military capacity or efforts to modernize 
are not in line with its stated intentions.102  For the Japanese side of this deadly equation, 
Tomohiko Taniguchi provides an idealistic recommendation: 
A security dilemma serves no one’s interests. The Japanese government 
must invite Chinese defense planners to Tokyo regularly so they can 
scrutinize Japan’s defense buildup and developments. This attempt at 
transparency should be unwavering and unilateral, with or without 
reciprocal action from the Chinese side, in order for Japan to achieve the 
moral high ground.103 
In realistic terms, such a policy is unlikely to be adopted by the Japanese government.  
With China’s relative gains over Japan in both economic and political power during the 
last two decades, Tokyo is increasingly apprehensive of China’s emergence as a capable 
revisionist power.  In the words of Denny Roy, as of late, “Japanese exhibit more 
sensitivity to the balance of power in Asia, less willingness to accept unique restrictions 
based on their experience during the Pacific War, and a greater inclination to reconsider 
Japan’s defense policies.”104  In order to maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia, 
it is essential that the United States maintain a substantial military presence in the region 
for the foreseeable future.  The countries of the region have come to expect the United 
States to provide this public good.  This is especially important while China is in 
potential democratic transition and Japan is suffering through residual economic 
stagnation.   
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In addition, the United States should encourage Japan to postpone revision of 
Article 9 until the 75th anniversary of its signing (3 May 2022) in order to provide time 
for China to proceed down its road towards full fledge democracy.  This policy would 
increase the transparency of the issue on both sides.  Specifically, the growth of 
democratic institutions in China and the separation of Japan’s revision of Article 9 from a 
particular administration will help to alleviate problems of transparency and signaling as 
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IV. KOREAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND REVISION OF 
ARTICLE 9 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Korea105-Japan state-to-state relationship is both complicated and nuanced.  
Unlike Korea’s neighbors to the north—China—it had the misfortune of enduring thirty-
five years of direct Japanese subjugation and, even before that period, an additional 
fifteen years of pervasive influence.  Many students of East Asian regional affairs 
simplistically cite this “history” as the primary factor inhibiting further cooperation and 
understanding between Japan and the two Koreas.  However, more than “history” affects 
the willingness of North and South Korea to accept Japanese revision of Article 9, and, 
therefore, a greater role in regional security affairs.  Will the Korean peninsula balance 
against what it perceives as a militarily rising Japan, hence fueling downward security 
spirals in the region, or acquiesce to its “hegemonic” ambitions?  What will Korea’s 
approach be to manage this dilemma and what are the interests, factors, and instruments 
driving it?  Finally, what will Japan’s response be to this “approach,” and what impact 
will other regional powers—the United States and China—have on this relationship? 
Numerous sayings have been “coined” over the years to characterize this 
relationship, and Korea’s position within it.  For example:  “Korea is a dagger pointed at 
the heart of Japan;” “Korea is the land bridge to Asia;” “Korea is a shrimp between two 
whales;” and, most recently, Korea as the second tier of “the flying geese.”  Setting aside 
these rudimentary portrayals, this chapter, in its first four sections, analyzes the current 
dynamics of this complex relationship and provides an assessment of the Korean 
response to Japanese revision of Article 9.  These sections will dissect this regional issue 
in three parts:  1) an overview of relations; 2) an assessment of the interests and factors 
driving both Seoul’s and Pyongyang’s approach; and 3) an analysis of each Koreas’ 
approach to revision of Article 9.  Once the groundwork has been laid, sections five and 
six will provide an assessment of the possible and likely responses that Japan may take in 
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the face of Korean pressure, and, finally, will close by analyzing the prospects for Korean 
success and briefly review the impact that third-party regional actors may have on the 
outcome and process. 
B. KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS OVERVIEW 
Diplomatic relations between Japan and the Korean peninsula have been mired 
over the last half-century by persistent political squabbling.  In the south, Tokyo and 
Seoul did not re-establish normalized diplomatic relations until 1965, over twenty years 
after the end of World War II and the collapse of the Japanese colonial empire.  For the 
northern half of the Korean peninsula—the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) — normalization of state-to-state relations with Japan continues to elude the two 
sides.  Despite normalization, relations between South Korea and Japan proceeded rather 
cautiously.  As Victor Cha states, “It was not until 1979, a full 14 years after 
normalisation (and decades more of mutually held Cold War security threats), that Seoul 
and Tokyo established the first bilateral consultative council on security affairs (a 
parliamentary body).”106  This section will provide a brief overview of this relationship 
in three parts: 1) ROK-Japan relations; 2) DPRK-Japan relations; and 3) Japan’s polices 
towards the two Koreas. 
Since the end of Japanese occupation and the solidification of the division on the 
Korean peninsula, numerous factors have contributed to the vacillating ROK-Japan 
diplomatic relationship.  A few of the primary impediments have been:  a Korean identity 
based on opposition to Japan; chronic trade deficits; and, certainly, Japanese treatment of 
“history.”  As Victor Cha and Selig Harrison have so thoughtfully identified, the Korean 
identity and its associated nationalism is foundationally built on a premise of “anti-
Japanism.”107  Due to this underlying sentiment, it has been difficult for Koreans to set 
aside this identity to achieve greater cooperation with its Japanese neighbors.  In addition, 
this anti-Japan attitude has been institutionally reinforced in the two major national 
holidays that the ROK celebrates each year—Independence Movement Day (1 March) 
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and Independence Day (15 August).108  The establishment of these dates as days to 
reinforce the memory of Japanese aggression has become so institutionalized that the 
current Korean president, Roh Moo hyun, uses them to issue public statements 
admonishing Japan about its remembrance of history.109   
Another factor that fuels South Korean weariness of Japanese intentions is the chronic 
trade deficit that is in Tokyo’s favor.  In August of 2005, Yonhap News reported that, 
Last year [2004], South Korea reported its largest-ever trade deficit of 
US$24.4 billion with Japan, the highest level on record among all its 
trading partners, according to the nation's Commerce Ministry. 
Warning of the perils of becoming an economic tributary to Japan, the 
deficit has snowballed in recent years, with the deficits of $9.9 billion in 
2001, $14.7 billion in 2002 and $19 billion in 2003. 
For the January-June period of 2005, South Korea also posted a $11.9 
billion trade deficit with Japan, the ministry's recent snapshot of trade 
activity showed.110 
Selig Harrison, in his book Korean Endgame, succinctly captures the Korean 
sentiment when he states, “Japanese companies, in turn, did their part to make South 
Korea dependent on Japanese technology, rather than other foreign technology, by 
establishing informal control over South Korean enterprises through dummy partners and 
technical assistance or licensing agreements, as distinct from equity investment.”111 
Finally, a key aspect of Japan-Korean relations is its long and colored history.  
Many of the problems that hinder cooperation today either directly or indirectly stem 
from history-related issues.  The period that is of greatest focus is from the annexation of 
Korea in 1910 until the surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945.  In addition, post-World 
War II history has complicated the relationship even further.  These issues will be 
                                                 
108 Independence Movement Day commemorates the beginning of the Korean independence 
movement on March 1, 1919.  “On this day, independence fighters announced Korea's declaration of 
independence from Japanese colonialism. In response, Japanese police and military forces killed and 
injured thousands of unarmed protestors.” See 
http://www.lifeinkorea.com/Calendar/holiday.cfm?FileName=mar1 (accessed May 2006).  Independence 
Day commemorates the end to Japanese rule of the peninsula.  
109 “S. Korea's Roh raps Japan on History,” The Korea Herald, March 2, 2006. 
110 “Korea Inc.'s Economic Reliance on Japan Deepens,” Yonhap News, August 11, 2005, 
http://english.yna.co.kr/Engnews/20050811/480100000020050811153328EP.html (accessed May 2006). 
111 Harrison, Korean Endgame, 297.    
44 
discussed throughout the remainder of this chapter, but they deserve mention since they 
are important facets of the overall relationship:  1) the kidnapping of Japanese by the 
North; 2) Pyongyang missile tests; 3) the collapse of the Agreed Framework to 
denuclearize North Korea; and 4) the subsequent creation of the Six-Party Talks 
mechanism.  Japan’s legacy in Korea is harsh, be it comfort women, forced labor, 
eradication of the Korean culture, or direct subjugation.  Therefore, it is not surprising 
that history, if encouraged, can play a prominent role in state-to-state relations. 
In contrast to these negative aspects of the relationship, there have been counter 
forces that have brought these two states closer together.  One such force that numerous 
analysts cite has been the persistent threat of a North Korean attack as an impetus for 
closer ROK-Japan relations.112  For example, within two months of the August 1998 
DPRK Taepodong missile launch over the Japanese archipelago, Seoul and Tokyo issued 
a joint declaration pledging greater security cooperation.113  Within two months of this 
agreement, a “torrent” of military exchanges and joint exercises had begun to take 
form.114  Contributing to or a byproduct of this warming of diplomatic relations, there 
are some indications that, on the social and cultural level, relations appear to be 
improving since normalization.  “The number of Japanese tourists visiting Korea in 2004 
was some 2.4 million, up more than 30 percent from the 1.8 million figure for 2003.  
More Korean tourists are also visiting Japan as part of increasingly diversified tour 
programs, and 2005 has been designated as Korea-Japan Friendship Year.”115  In 
addition, during the period from 1998 to 2002, positive relations flourished, culminating 
in the co-hosting of the 2002 World Cup.  According to a joint survey conducted upon 
completion of the World Cup in July 2002 by Japanese and Korean newspapers, Asahi 
Shimbun and Dong-A Ilbo, 78.8 percent of Korean and 79 percent of Japanese 
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respondents projected that their two countries would “move into a more desirable 
relationship.”116   
The above examples provide a clear demonstration of the positive impact that 
individual leadership can have on this relationship.  It is not a coincidence that this 
dramatic thawing of South Korean-Japanese relations took place during the 
administration of Kim Dae-jung—popularly known as DJ.  DJ’s “history” with Japan 
guided his policy initiatives, which led to the temporary “healing” of the South Korea-
Japan relationship.  In the early 1970s, DJ was residing in Japan where he was 
responsible for an opposition movement against then President Park Chung-hee.  The 
extent of his ties to Tokyo became more evident in the aftermath of his abduction from 
the safety of Japan by ROK special agents on 8 August 1973 and later when Park’s 
successor Chun Doo-hwan sentenced him to death.  The Japanese government protested 
against the trial and used diplomatic efforts to influence his release.117  Because of this 
support as Moon and Suh surmise, “…much of his [DJ’s] effort later to improve Korean-
Japanese relations could be attributed to the action of Japanese when he was 
kidnapped.”118   
However, under the current leadership of President Roh Moo-hyun, there has 
been a “shift” in the administration’s polices regarding relations with Japan.119  In 
essence, the shift is to a “hard line” stance against what is perceived as Japan’s attempt to 
achieve regional hegemony and its lack of remorse for the atrocities that it committed 
during World War II.  Under the Roh administration, these “hard spots” in the 
relationship—specifically textbook revision, apologies, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and 
claims to Dokdo/Takeshima—have emerged as what appear to be insurmountable issues.   
In contrast to the wide array of issues that bind and divide the southern half of the 
Korean peninsula and Japan, in the North there are three key aspects that define the 
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Pyongyang-Tokyo relationship (besides military threat—discussed separately):  1) 
normalization; 2) the “aid” package that will come with normalization; and 3) regime 
legitimacy.  The formal normalization process began in September 1995 when Japan’s 
Prime Minister Murayama announced his intention to begin the process.120 These early 
attempts failed for various reasons and the process has been stalled ever since.  This year 
[2006], the DPRK and Japan are scheduled to resume talks concerning the normalization 
of diplomatic relations.121  The primary reason why Pyongyang is so persistent in its 
efforts to normalize relations is the much-needed economic “aid” package that will come 
with it.  North Korea’s economic health has suffered significantly since the end of the 
Cold War; therefore, the $5-$10 billion dollar normalization reparation package is viewed 
as essential to regime survival and to assist with economic recovery.122  The final factor 
in the DPRK-Japan relationship is similar to that of the ROK in that regime legitimacy 
has traditionally been founded on opposition to Japan.  In the words of David Fouse, 
“…North Korea stood out as a special challenge given that its leadership had defined its 
own legitimacy unequivocally in terms of opposition to Japanese colonial oppression.”123  
This phenomenon is “baggage” remaining from the original split of the Korean Peninsula 
and Pyongyang’s insistence that it was the true nationalist freedom fighters and, thus, had 
the right to rule.  However, the leadership in the South was Japanese collaborators and, 
therefore, their credibility to rule Korea was illegitimate, or so they claimed.  These three 
factors in the DPRK-Japan relationship are the most prominent issues that will influence 
Pyongyang’s approach to revision of Article 9.  However, there are numerous other 
issues that divide these two countries, with the most obvious being military contention.  
This factor will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 
On the other side of this bilateral relationship, Japan has consistently demonstrated that 
the main concern in its relationship with the ROK and DPRK is continued stability, 
thereby ensuring an amenable regional and international environment for economic 
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growth.  Thus, Japan supports the status quo of a divided Korea, is apprehensive toward 
the hard-line policy approach that the United States at times pursues, and is primarily 
focused on its economic relationship with the Korean peninsula or, what is termed in 
Japanese, seikei bunri (separating political and economic issues).  As Edward Olsen 
states in his book Korea:  The Divided Nation, 
While many in the Japanese public may share that skepticism about U.S. 
policies, the conservative government under the Koizumi administration 
that held office at the same time as Roh and Bush, clearly was empathetic 
toward a more hard-line approach to North Korea, critical of Roh, and 
uneasy about the prospects of China gaining more clout in guiding the 
inter-Korean efforts to resolve the tensions created by the DPRK’s nuclear 
option.124  
The key word in the above quote is “empathetic;” Tokyo is “sensitive” to the actions of 
the United States but still follows a pragmatic policy approach.  This is not to say that 
Japan does not react when North Korea “rattles its cage,” but rather that over the long 
term it is more focused on a slow evolutionary change on the peninsula.  Specifically, 
Tokyo’s two major concerns with the unification of Korea are the massive refugee 
problem that a North Korean collapse would cause125 and the inheritance of nuclear and 
other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by the ROK.126  Finally, over the last two 
decades, Japan has become more focused on the benefits of establishing multilateral and 
regional organizations to deal with foreign policy problems.  In particular, it has proposed 
or helped to establish the Six-Party framework that currently exists to deal with the 
DPRK nuclear issue, a Free Trade agreement (FTA) between Japan, Korea, and ASEAN, 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization,127 and an Asia Monetary  
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Fund (AMF).  Therefore, it is important to observe a pattern of growing regional 
engagement through multilateral institutions.128 
C. KOREAN INTERESTS AND FACTORS 
This section will explore and analyze the five predominant interests and factors 
that have influenced the above outlined approach of the two Koreas.  Specifically, the 
five factors that will be explored are:  1) territorial integrity; 2) economics; 3) historical 
revisionism / antagonism; 4) nationalism; and 5) normalization.    
The first factor that influences South Korea’s approach to Japanese revision of 
Article 9 is the persistence of Japanese claim to the island the ROK calls Dokdo and the 
Japanese call Takeshima.  In 2005, this issue was rekindled when Japan’s Shimane 
prefecture established 22 February as Takeshima Day and “during a press conference in 
Seoul in February 2005, Japan’s Ambassador to Korea Takano Toshiyuki brazenly 
claimed that Dokdo belongs to Japan.”129  As Choi Sung-jae reveals in his article, “The 
Politics of the Dokdo Issue,” this foreign policy problem has been captured by domestic 
political forces and established as a topic that, “no ambitious politicians in Korea can 
ignore….”130  The Dokdo factor will continue to influence the foreign policy approach of 
South Korea as long as elements in Japan continue to verbally and physically131 attempt 
to claim the island.  These claims, combined with a Japan that appears to be shedding 
some of its pre-existing military constraints—with the revision of Article 9 and the 
movement towards establishing the defense agency as a full ministry—have made Korea 
apprehensive about Japan’s goals and doubtful of its overall transparency.   
The second interest that has guided Korea’s approach towards its neighbor across 
the East Sea is and has been economic.  In particular, there are three subcategories that 
are of concern to Seoul and Pyongyang:  1) dependence; 2) retribution or compensation; 
and 3) assistance with ensuring an economic “soft landing” for North Korea.  The ROK is 
extremely wary of its dependence on the Japanese economy.  This is evident in its 
                                                 
128 Tsueno Akaha, “Japan’s Policy toward North Korea: Interests and Opinions,” in The Future of 
North Korea, (London:  Routledge, 2002), 91. 
129 Kim, “Roh Moo-hyun’s Policy toward Japan,” 39. 
130 Choi, “The Dokdo Issue,” 489. 
131 “A more recent example of more extreme tactics was Nihon Shidokai’s ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt to actually land on the island in May 2004.”  See Choi, “The Dokdo Issue,” 476.  
49 
concern over the trade deficit that exists and in its opposition to Tokyo’s efforts to 
establish a “Yen bloc,” or even a Japan-led Asian Monetary Fund (AMF).  The DPRK 
has not had the opportunity to develop a dependence on the official Japanese economy, 
but rather, over the last six decades, it has become increasingly reliant on the monetary 
interaction that comes from the pro-North Korean organization in Japan—Chosen 
Soren.132  In recent years, the Japanese government has made a concerted effort to 
eliminate the economic remittance moving from Chosen Soren to the Kim Jong-il regime 
in response to events such as the Taepodong missile launch of 2002.  It has accomplished 
this task through unfavorable banking regulations for Chosen Soren-run banks and by 
establishing strict maritime laws that mandate the need for insurance for all vessels 
docking in Japanese ports.  This is restrictive to North Korean shipping because its 
vessels are the primary uninsured users of Japanese ports.  Second, as detailed in section 
one, the DPRK is extremely interested in the amount of “retribution” that it may be able 
to extract from Tokyo for its World War II aggression.  The ROK is also watching 
closely to see that the North’s compensation is equitable to what it received in 1965 and 
because the remittance will help the South with its strategic goal of ensuring a “soft 
landing” for Pyongyang’s failed economy.  As Kaseda Yoshinori states about the Kim 
Dae-jung administration, “President Kim, whose Sunshine policy had promoted the soft-
landing of the crippled North Korean economy, also wanted to see greater Japanese 
economic assistance to North Korea because the financial burden for the soft-landing was 
too much for South Korea alone to shoulder.”133  Therefore, on the one hand, Korea is 
concerned about its dependence on the Japanese economy but, on the other hand, both 
sides of the demilitarized zone see the necessity of Japanese assistance.  These economic 
issues certainly contribute to the foreign policy outlook and approach detailed above. 
The third factor that influences the use of an approach of opposition, balancing, 
and coercion is the history issue.  There are a number of specific issues that stem from 
this factor—the Yasukuni Shrine; textbook disputes; historical apologies; and reparations 
for comfort women and forced labor.  These have become important issues for both 
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North and South Korea because the division of the peninsula and, thus, the establishment 
of these two separate states, are indirectly attributable to the legacy of Japan.  If Japan 
had respected the sovereignty of the Korean kingdom back in 1910, there would not have 
been the need to divide the nation into Soviet and American “trusteeships” in 1945.  In 
addition, the occupation of Korea by Japan was brutal and bloody, leaving a permanent 
mark on the Korean peninsula.  Three of the more pungent examples from this period of 
brutality are:  the use of Korean girls as sex slaves for the Japanese Imperial Army 
fighting in Manchuria and greater China; the use of forced labor throughout the Empire; 
and the attempted eradication of the Korean culture through political, social, and 
educational indoctrination.  Therefore, it is not surprising that the two Koreas are 
skeptical of any attempt by Japan to assume more responsibility for regional security 
because it feels that Tokyo has not reassured the region with an adequate apology for its 
atrocities from the last time it was a “normal nation.”  For example, even the written 
apology provided to Kim Dae-jung in 1998 can be called into question because, as Selig 
Harrison points out, “…the word for ‘apology’ used in the Japanese text of this 
declaration, owabi, is weaker and more ambiguous than shojai, the word that Seoul had 
suggested.”134  Thus, this lack of what some consider a sincere apology and regional 
refusal to forget the past has contributed to the distrust that exists today between Japan 
and its neighbors.135  Therefore, this phenomenon contributes to the apprehension Korea 
has concerning the “normalization” of Japanese security forces.  
The fourth factor that influences the Korean approach is nationalism.  As detailed 
in section one, nationalism was a foundational factor in the creation and maintenance of 
the ROK and DPRK.  Before Japanese colonization, Korea lacked a strong identity as a 
Western-type nation state.136  Therefore, its subjugation was the spark for a Korean 
national identity that was founded on anti-Japanese colonialism.  In the words of Victor 
Cha, a highly regarded expert on Korea, 
Negatively constructed nationalisms and nationalist myths are not unique 
to Korea; however the degree to which this identity is so viscerally framed 
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against a past aggressor may marginally distinguish the Korean case.  For 
example, the two national holidays in Korea (1 March or samilchol and 15 
August or kwangbokchol) celebrate Korean patriotism by specifically 
resurrecting anti-Japanese images.  The fiftieth anniversary celebrations of 
Korean independence in 1995 were marked by an excessively expensive 
raising (over $200 million) of the National Museum (the former colonial 
headquarters of Japan).  By contrast, 4 July is a patriotic institution in the 
US but its construction is a a pro-American holiday more than an 
explicitly anti-British one.137 
This “us vs. them” type of nationalism is reinforced through state propaganda in 
the North and strategic statements made on specific anniversaries in the South.  Of 
interest is the recent phenomenon of a united Korean remembrance and protest.  In 2005, 
both sides of the peninsula observed the 60th anniversary of Liberation Day by 
announcing a Joint statement calling for Japan to “stop distorting the past and pay as 
compensation for its past invasions and crimes.”138  In addition, “the two sides urged 
Tokyo to end attempts to whitewash war crimes, withdraw amendments to Article 9 of 
the Japanese Constitution which commits the country to pacifism, suspend Tokyo's 
military expansionist policies and its deployment of forces overseas, and end sanctions 
against North Korea.”139 
Finally, the last factor that bears upon North Korea’s approach is diplomatic 
normalization with Japan.  This process has been two decades in the making.  However, 
progress has been stalled due to the relatively recent disclosure that the DPRK had been 
abducting Japanese citizens to assist its spies in infiltrating Japan.  The 2002 Koizumi-
Kim summit in Pyongyang secured the return of those still alive, but this has only spurred 
increased popular resentment for the communist regime and calls for a full accounting of 
those who had died while in captivity.  Barring a dramatic change in the DPRK’s position 
on the issue, a diplomatic stalemate will persist for some time to come.  South Korea’s 
détente with the North has altered its position on Tokyo-Pyongyang normalization.  
However, Seoul is still wary of Japan gaining the upper hand on the peninsula.  In the 
words of Yoshinori Kaseda, “historically, Seoul has shown strong displeasure when 
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Japan improves its relations with Pyongyang more than Seoul did.”140  In addition, South 
Korea is determined to separate the ongoing Six-Party Talks from either abduction or 
normalization issues, but Japan persistently attempts to push these issues onto the agenda.  
“Song Min-soon, chief negotiator of the Republic of Korea (ROK), pointed out at the six-
party talks' opening ceremony that the current round of talks should focus on the Korean 
nuclear issue.”141  Referring to the attempt by the Japanese delegation to introduce the 
abduction issue, he said, “it is inappropriate to distract the talks from its focal point.”142  
This factor and the four others detailed above—1) territorial integrity; 2) economics; 3) 
historical revisionism / antagonism; and 4) nationalism—each in their own way influence 
the approach that Seoul and Pyongyang take to deal with Japanese revision of Article 9.  
The next section will explore the instruments and channels that the two Koreas use to 
promote modification or change of Japanese initiatives. 
D. KOREA’S APPROACH  
Do the two Koreas believe that Japanese revision of Article 9 is a foreign policy 
problem?  What has been its approach to deal with this issue and what instruments or 
channels has it used to achieve its desired end-state?  In the words of the DPRK state-run 
internet web portal Naenara, “Japan runs amuck to bury Article 9 of the constitution now 
in force which stipulates that Japan should abandon war and use of armed forces and 
have no war forces in a bid to turn itself into a war country on a lawful basis.”143  In 
addition, in March 2006, South Korean President Roh gave a similar assessment of 
Japan’s actions without the scathing rhetoric, “if Japan wants to become a leading 
country in the world, it should gain trust from the international community through its 
conduct in light of universal human conscience and historical experience, not just by 
revising its laws or strengthening its military forces.”144  It is evident from the above 
statements and the decision by President Roh to reject Prime Minister Koizumi’s request 
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for a summit in 2005,145 that the current leadership on the Korean peninsula are 
concerned about revision of Article 9 and, more specifically, about a growing desire by 
Tokyo to assume more autonomy for its military protection.  To cope with this policy 
dilemma, the two Koreas have:  1) opposed; 2) balanced; and 3) attempted to coerce.  All 
three of these maneuvers are attempts to encourage Japan to slow down its security 
reform initiatives and to take into consideration the concerns of its regional neighbors.  
However, unlike the China case, South Korean protest, in general, does not directly 
attack or mention the revision of Article 9 but rather it focuses on other issues that are 
reflective of a changing Japan—Yasukuni Shrine visits, ahistorical textbook revision, and 
rising claims to the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima islands. 
1. Oppose 
A standard foreign policy tactic of nations is to oppose the actions of other nations 
in order to influence a desired response.  In keeping with this tactic, over the last five 
decades of normalized relations between the ROK and Japan, Seoul has opposed a 
number of its initiatives and actions.  One of the more recent examples is Japan’s attempt 
to establish an Asian equivalent to the International Monetary Fund, which would have 
provided a safety net for Asian participants faced with economic financial crisis.  In the 
words of Moon and Suh, “national sentiments in South Korea would not tolerate Japan’s 
hegemonic ascension in the region’s economic sphere.”146  In addition, both the textbook 
and Yasukuni Shrine controversies have fueled heated opposition by the two Koreas to 
Japanese historical revisionism and antagonism.147  In response to Koizumi’s first visit as 
Prime Minister in 2001, South Korea’s ruling Millennium Democratic Party 
“…lawmakers delivered a letter of protest to the Japanese Embassy in Seoul in which 
they expressed "deep disappointment and a sense of betrayal" at Koizumi's shrine visit 
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and demanded an apology from him along with a declaration that he would not visit the 
shrine again in the future.148   
The primary instruments that Korea has used to mediate Japanese behavior are 
domestic protest and diplomatic rhetoric.  As demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
domestic protest has been an effective tool for the Chinese government in its attempts to 
influence the Japanese decision-making process.  However, for Korea, this channel has 
been less effective because the North is internationally marginalized as radical and 
insignificant and the South does not have the same level of control over its population as 
Beijing does.  Through its control of the media and the police force, China can spur and 
end domestic protest more effectively than a democratically-elected regime can through a 
free press and a police force that represents the people rather than the state or party.  
Along these same lines, the North does have a distinct advantage in using the third 
instrument of diplomatic rhetoric.  Even if it is disregarded internationally, it is still an 
important tool for influencing the dialogue on the issue.  As detailed in section one, the 
DPRK has been consistent in its use of its state run media sources to reprimand Japanese 
behavior.  On the contrary, the ROK is at the mercy of the free press to convey its 
messages of displeasure. 
This tactic or approach has had a mixed track record of success.  It influenced 
Prime Minister Nakasone’s decision to apologize and cease any further visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine during his tenure in office.149  In addition, in the case of the textbook 
controversy of 1986, it produced an apology and resignation of the education minister.150  
However, today this approach appears to be having little effect on the Koizumi 
administration.  Korean opposition only had a minimal impact on Koizumi’s first visit to 
the Yasukuni Shrine as Prime Minister.  Specifically, he changed the date of his visit 
from the anniversary of the end of World War II (August 15), as was promised during his 
election campaign, to two days prior.151  Nevertheless, this acquiescence by Koizumi did 
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not satisfy Japan’s regional neighbors.152  Also, under the current Japanese 
administration, Korean opposition to recent textbook revisions has had similarly little 
effect.   This defiant behavior by Tokyo, many believe, is predominantly fueled by the 
charismatic nationalistic behavior of Prime Minister Koizumi and is reinforced by the 
George W. Bush administration.  Indeed, the next three years will see three of the four 
leaders in this four-sided relationship—Japan, United States, ROK, and DPRK—turn 
over, and with that, a very different dynamic may emerge.  In the near term, Korea will 
continue to use opposition to influence Japanese behavior with varying degrees of 
success. 
2. Balance   
The second facet of the Korean approach to the foreign policy problem of 
Japanese revisionist behavior has been to balance against what is perceived as an 
initiative by Tokyo to establish itself as a regional hegemon.  Korea’s regional balancing 
has taken on two particular forms:  alignment with China; and militarily.  As Kim Hosup 
states, 
…a basic policy adjustment has been adopted by the Roh administration in 
terms of Korea’s role within the existing Northeast Asian order.  In 
particular, the President has stated that Korea would play a balancing role 
in assuring the peace and prosperity of not only the Korean peninsula but 
Northeast Asia as well…153 
Korea’s geographical and political positions in Northeast Asia make it well suited 
to play the balancing role that South Korean President Roh desires.  The last two 
centuries have demonstrated Korea’s importance as the country at “the center” of Sino-
Japanese contention and, with political hostilities on the rise, the Korean peninsula will 
once again find itself in the middle of this conflict.154 
Aligning with China is one instrument the two Koreas have pursued in an effort to 
balance against Japan.  The beginning of this policy shift has started to take place both 
economically and politically.  Economic integration between the two Koreas and China is 
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growing.  In 2004, an Asian Times article insightfully describes the changing regional 
order in Northeast Asia, 
However, this time "China's soft power" is no longer Confucianism, but 
the even more influential economic and trading power in this rapidly 
globalizing world economy. And Koreans, befitting their ancient proud 
self-appellation of being a "mini-China", have certainly caught the tide 
early on. The world has just witnessed the epochal event in 2003 when 
two-way Sino-South Korea trade exceeded that between South Korea and 
the No 1 economy on earth, the US, barely 10 years after the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two Cold War 
ideological and battlefield enemies.155 
This phenomenon is evident in the rapid growth of economic exchanges between 
both halves of the Korean peninsula.  As mentioned above, in 2003, China surpassed the 
United States as the number one recipient of Korean exports and this has continued to be 
the case since.  On the cultural level, in May 2006, China and South Korea “signed an 
agreement to enhance the exchanges and cooperation on culture and copyright 
issues….According to the agreement, the two sides will help with each other and seek 
common benefits within the World Trade Organization and other international 
institutions.”156  On the economic side, for the ROK, Seoul is apprehensive of any FTA 
that does not include China as one of the principal partners.  Politically, as North Korea’s 
only remaining security treaty partner, Pyongyang understands that its regime survival is 
dependent on the “China factor.”  Additionally, China’s honest broker leadership within 
the multilateral Six-Party Talks has increased its political currency with the Roh 
administration.  In the words of Dennis Halpin, a senior staff member on the House 
Committee on International Relations, “I am worried Korea is a ripe apple swinging on a 
very weak twig waiting to fall into the lap of China.  I see Chinese influence rising on the 
whole Korean Peninsula, and that's a danger to our [U.S.] strategic interest in Asia.”157 
Depending on the severity of the perceived crisis, South Korea will forgo its 
desire to play the balancer in Northeast Asia in order to secure its national interests with                                                  
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the assistance of China.  Kim Hosup chronicles this phenomenon under the Roh 
administration:  
Korea’s desire to expand its military cooperation with China, in 
accordance with its policy of playing a balancing role or serving as a 
‘balancer’ within the Northeast Asian order, is related to the issue of 
Japan’s colonial rule and aggression.  After returning from a Korea-China 
defense ministerial meeting held in China in April 2005, Defense Minister 
Yoon Kwang-ung expressed the promotion of a balanced military 
diplomacy toward neighboring states as a means of preserving Korea’s 
national interests.  In calling for ‘Korea to hold defense-related meetings 
with Japan and China at an equal frequency,’ Yoon [ROK Defense 
Minister] thus made clear his intention of playing the China card, in this 
particular case Seoul-Beijing military cooperation, in order to check 
Japan.158 
Korea’s ability to use this “China card” to balance and at the same time not 
become entangled in a Chinese sphere of influence is doubtful.  As China “rises,” the 
probability of it “reshaping the regional order”159 grows, and, consequently, the ability of 
Seoul to use the “China card” to its own advantage will diminish.  Therefore, over the 
long run, South Korea will need to decide where it fits into a Chinese-dominated regional 
order and whether it is ready to forgo its traditional quasi alliance with the United States 
and Japan.160 
Finally, both Koreas have used military balancing to dissuade Japan from 
expanding its military capabilities.  Theoretically, the buildup of defensive weapons, 
particularly in defense dominant geographies like Northeast Asia, should not cause a 
spiral of tension.  However, Hwang Jihwan postulates that the “deep-seated historical 
antagonism can make the defensive stance seem offensive in East Asia.”161  One 
demonstration of this has been the two countries’ past responses to a hostile North Korea 
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and a “rising” China.  Within the confines of traditional balance of power theory, one 
would have expected Japan and South Korea to develop a countervailing alliance.  
However, an increase in security cooperation has not been the case; instead, what can be 
observed are increased tensions on the part of both nations, thereby increasing the 
probability of downward security spirals.162 
3. Coerce 
Finally, the last facet of the two Koreas’ approach to resolving Japanese foreign 
policy problems is to coerce.  The clearest examples of the use of coercion come from the 
DPRK because it typically involves some sort of overt military action—Taepodong 
missile tests, incursions into Japanese territorial waters, and nuclear brinkmanship.  
However, how much of President Roh’s comments condemning Tokyo’s behavior is 
directed at a Japanese domestic audience is hard to determine.  Nevertheless, his 
comments certainly help to fuel protests by the Japanese domestic left against regionally 
provocative behavior.  By the same token, North Korea has also used methods at its 
disposal to attempt to coerce Tokyo to acquiesce to Pyongyang’s demands.  David Fouse 
provides an excellent example of such behavior; “with Japan unwilling to move forward 
on normalization talks despite the return visit of the Japanese wives, North Korea 
determined to up the ante again in August 1998 with the test launch of a Taepodong 
rocket, which traversed northern Japan before falling into the Pacific Ocean.”163   A clear 
connection between the DPRK’s use of coercion and Japanese revision Article 9 is not 
evident.  However, it has demonstrated that it has used brinkmanship in the past, so it is 
probable that it would use it in the future. 
In particular, the northern half of the Korean peninsula has consistently relied on 
brinkmanship as a foreign policy instrument.  Some of the more prominent examples are 
the 1994 crisis that brought Northeast Asia to the brink of war and the 1998 Taepodong 
rocket launch over Japan.  The importance of this event in Japanese life and politics is 
poignantly described by Yoichi Funabashi.  As the missile passed through Japanese 
airspace, it “had a psychological impact on the Japanese equivalent to the Sputnik shock 
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to the American people in 1957.”164  This attempt by North Korea to encourage Tokyo to 
return to the negotiating table165 has had the unintended effect of providing the ultra-
conservative elements in Japan with the domestic support they needed to push for 
expanded military capabilities and confrontational behavior.  This behavior on the part of 
North Korea could likely encourage downward security spirals throughout the region, not 
just between the DPRK and Japan.  As Thomas J. Christensen states,  
the theory [security dilemma theory] states that, in an uncertain and 
anarchic international system, mistrust between two or more potential 
adversaries can lead each side to take precautionary and defensively 
motivated measures that are perceived as offensive threats.  This can lead 
to countermeasures in kind, thus ratcheting up regional tensions, reducing 
security, and creating self-fulfilling prophecies about the danger of one’s 
security environment.166 
Therefore, based on the current state of affairs in Northeast Asia, it is probable that North 
Korea will continue to use brinkmanship because there is little for it to lose. 
In summary, if Japan precedes down its ad hoc road to Article 9 revision, the two 
Koreas will likely use opposition, balancing, and coercion to cope with this perceived 
foreign policy dilemma.  Whether this approach and these instruments will be effective in 
slowing the process of Japanese military “normalization,” and what the possible 
responses from Tokyo might be, will be explored in the following section. 
E. POSSIBLE JAPANESE RESPONSES 
Based on the above analysis and the determination that the two Koreas will use 
opposition, balancing, and coercion to deal with the problem of Japanese revision of 
Article 9:  What will Tokyo’s response be when presented with such an effort?  This 
section will outline three predominant responses that have emerged over the last sixty 
years and conclude with a prediction of what Japan’s response will be to the issue at hand 
and why.  The three overarching responses that can be observed are:  1) moderation; 2) 
status quo; and 3) defiance.   
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A successful Korean approach will produce a moderated Japanese response and a 
change in its behavior.  There are two important examples of this approach achieving at 
least partial success on the controversial Yasukuni Shrine issue:  Prime Minister 
Nakasone’s apology and change in policy concerning his visits to the Shrine in the 1980s; 
and Prime Minister Koizumi’s partial acquiescence with his break in stated intentions by 
visiting a few days prior to 15 August 2001.  In addition, this approach was successful 
during the textbook revision controversies of 1982 and 1986.  As Lee Myon-woo details 
in his article, “Textbook Conflicts and Korea-Japan Relations,” in the case of the 1982 
crisis, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa announced that Japan would make the 
necessary amendments.167  The 1986 controversy had a similar outcome with a slight 
twist.  In the midst of the conflict, Fujio Masayuki, a known conservative, was appointed 
to the position of education minister and, in response to harsh criticism, he returned 
accusation with accusation.  “As the criticism abroad expanded, the Japanese government 
issued a formal apology for Fujio’s remarks and in the end accepted his resignation.”168  
These four episodes are demonstrations of the effectiveness of the Korean approach to 
achieve Japanese moderation in the face of perceived behavioral problems. 
The second possible response by the Japanese could be to simply maintain the 
“status quo” by neither moderating its behavior in response to the Korean approach nor 
responding with open defiance.  This response is prevalent today in the “foot dragging” 
policy that Tokyo is employing against North Korea.  Rather than assisting North Korea 
or siding with the United States to abruptly end the DPRK regime, Japan is biding its 
time and waiting for a gradual collapse.  By maintaining its “status quo” policy towards 
Korean unification, Japan believes that it can best serve its national interest.  A second 
example of this response is Japan’s reluctance to support Washington’s extreme tactic of 
stopping all oil supplies to the DPRK that were promised in the 1994 agreed framework.  
The last response that Tokyo may elect to follow is one of defiance to the Korean 
approach of behavioral moderation.  Under Prime Minister Koizumi’s leadership, this has 
emerged as the prescription of choice.  Authors such as Kaseda Yoshinori believe that 
North Korean coercion through the instrument of brinkmanship has spurred Japan to 
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break “…away from its longstanding pacifist policy and began to develop offensive 
capability and enhance its intelligence capability.”169  Most recently, there have been 
four examples of defiance in response to DPRK maneuvering:  1) the implementation of 
Theater Missile Defense (TMD); 2) setting aside the 1969 Diet Resolution that prohibited 
the military use of space by establishing a spy satellite program in 1998;170 3) 
strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance; and 4) the ending of Japanese food shipments to 
the DPRK in 2002 in response to its brinkmanship.  A Japanese response of defiance can 
also be observed in the textbook and Yasukuni Shrine controversies since Prime Minister 
Koizumi took office.   
In summary, the Japanese government has demonstrated all three responses at one 
period or another and the reason for this phenomenon predominantly falls on the 
shoulders of domestic politics and its leadership.  Prime Minister Koizumi is a 
charismatic and popular politician with a flare that is rare in Japanese politics; these traits 
have provided him with an unusually high degree of political autonomy.  Thus, if Tokyo 
hurriedly adopts some form of Article 9 revision, Korea will respond through opposition, 
balancing, and coercion to moderate Japanese behavior.  Japan’s counter response will 
depend on the leadership and the domestic political situation at the time.  However, if 
Koizumi or his possible successor Shinzo Abe is in office, the most likely response will 
be one of defiance.  This situation will fuel a security dilemma in Northeast Asia and a 
destructive downward security spiral.171  Therefore, what can be done to ameliorate this 
hazardous situation?  Moreover, what role has the United States and China played in 
producing this conflict?  In the last section of this chapter, the analysis will turn to look at 
the overall prospects for the Korea-Japan relationship and what influence the two other 
regional powers have had and could have on the process.   
F. PROSPECTS  
The prospects for a sanguine emergence of Japan as a “normalized” military 
power through the revision of Article 9 are bleak unless Japan increases its transparency 
and the time horizon surrounding such a dramatic shift in its security posture.  The 
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current ad hoc movement towards revision is fueling distrust and apprehension in Seoul 
and Pyongyang and, as of late, neither the United States nor China has been helping to 
ease this tension.  As Robyn Lim assesses:  
China's vital interest on the Korean peninsula is to exercise maximum 
influence over the process of reunification. The last thing China wants to 
see is a strong and independent state on its northeastern frontier, any more 
than it has wanted a strong and independent Vietnam on its southern 
borders.172 
With respect to the U.S. influence, of particular interest was the presumable effort 
by Washington to derail the Japan-DPRK normalization efforts in 2002.  “The prospects 
for the early conclusion of normalization treaty and for the rebuilding of the North 
Korean economy with Japanese economic cooperation further diminished and virtually 
evaporated when Washington revealed Pyongyang’s clandestine uranium enrichment 
program on October 16, 2002.”173  Is it a coincidence that this revelation came to light 
less than a month after Koizumi’s one-day summit with Kim Jong-il, which was intended 
to “kick start normalization” talks, and just one day after the much anticipated return of 
the five surviving abductees from North Korea?  The timing points to an intended effort 
by the United States to derail the normalization process because it was not in its interest 
to increase the longevity of the Kim dynasty—of which, it is feared, will likely proliferate 
WMD technologies and material—through the substantial Japanese economic package 
that would accompany normalization.  Victor Cha, in his theory of the quasi-alliance 
relationship that exists between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, describes 
another negative influence that Washington has on the relationship:   
…the U.S. presence may foster a ‘freedom of irresponsibility,’ in which 
the incentives for the two states, especially Korea, to approach relations in 
a more rational and constructive manner are low and the temptation to 
utilize bilateral animosities for domestic political purposes is high.174 
Whether it is intentional derailment or mere presence, the United States has an 
unmistakable influence on Korean-Japanese relations.  Thus, the question remains:  What 
can the United States do to abrogate the downward security spirals that will evolve from                                                  
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the ad hoc revision of Article 9?  In the next chapter, this question will be explored and 





































































V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This final chapter provides three policy recommendations that will assist in 
minimizing the emergence of downward security spirals in response to a militarily 
“normal” Japan.  In their most rudimentary form, these recommendations are founded on 
the stabilizing nature of the status quo security arrangement in Northeast Asia and, by 
slowing the emergence of Japan as a “normal” military actor in Northeast Asia for a 
specified period, they will help to ease the fears on the Korean peninsula and in China.  A 
declaratory policy of revising Article 9 on the 75th anniversary of the constitution’s 
enactment will assist in separating the practical need for revision and the inflammatory 
actions of any particular Japanese regime, as well as increase the transparency of the 
movement by providing direction to the current ad hoc attempts at revision.  In summary, 
the following are the recommendations to American policy makers:  1) encourage Japan 
to postpone the revision of Article 9 until the 75th constitutional anniversary; 2) maintain 
current military force levels in the region leading up to this transition date ; and 3) utilize 
Japan’s ability to project “soft power,” vice a narrow-sighted push for “hard power,” in 
the security alliance.  Execution of these policies will be a delicate diplomatic process 
and recommendations two and three should be implemented first because they foster a 
conducive environment for the achievement of policy recommendation one.  In order to 
accomplish this, the U.S. State Department will have to ensure a coherent and united 
front with their counterparts in the Defense Department.  Another important factor in the 
State Department’s implementation is not to appear as if the United States is attempting 
to meddle in Japanese domestic affairs.  This type of “non-interference” policy approach 
is important since recommendations two and three will assist in building an international 
environment in which Tokyo does not feel pressured to remilitarize. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Recommendation One 
First and foremost, U.S. policy should encourage Japan to postpone the revision 
of Article 9 until the 75th anniversary of the document’s enactment (3 May 2022).  This 
will have a stabilizing effect on the region for three pre-dominant reasons:  1) allows time 
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for Chinese democratic transition; 2) increasing the time horizon allows for more 
opportunity for a peaceful settlement of conflict on the Korean peninsula; and 3) 
separates revision from a particular political regime.   
As China grows in wealth, it will likely proceed down the road towards 
democracy and liberalization, which will then encourage a more stable and amenable 
relationship between Japanese and Chinese democracies.175  Signs of this democratic 
transition in China are becoming increasingly evident.  For example, reports from the 
March 2006 meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
(NPC) was telecast for the first time.  In the words of a top official involved, “Live 
telecast of delivery of the report aims to meet public demand for more information about 
NPC's work, including lawmaking and supervision….”176  The official goes on to say, 
“It's a part of China's ceaseless efforts to enhance transparency of NPC's work and 
promote political democracy.”177  On the legal front, “top Chinese lawmaker Wu 
Bangguo said here Thursday that the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People's 
Congress (NPC) will further promote democracy in its legislation by soliciting more 
public opinions.”178  In addition, as an “Open Source Center” analysis concludes, “the 
provocative articles express greater support for limited democratic institutions than is 
normally the case in PRC media, suggesting that party leaders are tolerating broad 
boundaries for the discussion of such issues.”179  Fundamentally, as one would expect, it 
is not in the interest of those who have a monopoly on power to willingly cede that power 
unless they are under tremendous pressure to do so.  Therefore, it is evident, from the 
increased discussion in government-controlled media and direct effort by the CPC to 
consider a wider variety of opinions on legal and legislative matters, that the seeds of 
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some form of democracy have been planted and are taking root.  It is probable that what 
will eventually emerge will not be some sort of clone of American democracy but, more 
likely—due to path-dependency stemming from its socialist political legacy—a 
European-style social democracy will establish itself.  However, the benefits of 
democratic peace are not an instantaneous phenomenon.  As Edward Mansfield, Jack 
Snyder, and numerous others have surmised, the transition phase to a mature democracy 
can actually produce a more volatile regional situation than when that regime was 
authoritarian ruled.180  Therefore, it is in the best interest of the United State to minimize 
distractions to this process of Chinese democratization.   
One of these distractions is the negative relationship that exists between what 
Beijing calls “Japan’s failure to acknowledge its history of aggression”—Yasukuni 
Shrine visits, right-wing textbooks, or remilitarization—and Chinese use of nationalism 
to support authoritarian regime legitimacy.181  In April 2005, this negative relationship 
became unmistakably evident when thousands of Chinese took to the streets to protest 
against Japanese behavior, quickly growing beyond government control.  As predicted by 
Mansfield and Snyder, “needing public support, they [ruling groups] rouse the masses 
with nationalist propaganda but find that their mass allies, once mobilized by passionate 
appeals, are difficult to control.”182  This event is important to the broader discussion of 
democracy because, as Qi Jing Ying, a Chinese doctoral student studying in Tokyo, has 
determined, “these old quarrels [over history] were only a pretext for the demonstrations 
last April.  The protests had as much to do with the ‘public thirst for democracy’ as they 
did with genuine anti-Japanese feeling”183 and demonstrate the correlation between 
nationalism, democratic transition, Japanese provocative behavior, and regional conflict.  
Thus, due to the conflictual nature of a democracy in transition and the need to minimize 
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opportunities for nationalist-driven regional conflict, it is essential that American policy 
assist in the peaceful transition of China to a mature democracy.   
In summary, as discussed in Chapters III and IV, the region is currently ripe with 
nationalism.  In China and North Korea, the governments are using this nationalism to 
legitimize their regimes and, in South Korea, it has become a historical legacy that has 
been passed down from one generation to another.  As Yinan He states, “elites sometimes 
shelve their historiographic differences with another country to concentrate on other 
immediate issues, but they tend to exploit the political benefit of international history 
disputes when they feel a strong sense of insecurity in domestic politics.”184  While 
China moves through its transition to democracy, this sense of insecurity will fade, as 
well as the need to use nationalism to provide regime legitimacy.  As Seymour Lipset 
postulates in his classic work on democratization theory, a crisis of legitimacy will occur 
during a transition to new social structure, but once democracy takes hold, that crisis will 
wane.185  In addition, there is a strong likelihood that, as the Chinese exploitation of “the 
history card” diminishes, the two Koreas will experience a less accepting environment for 
their use of it as well.  In fact, Seoul and Pyongyang will likely follow the lead of the 
Middle Kingdom on this issue, and if Japan is able to improve relations with China, then 
Chosun will follow closely behind.  Therefore, holding back revision of Article 9 of the 
Japanese constitution will provide China more time to move toward democratization, 
which will have a stabilizing effect not only in Sino-Japanese relations but also in 
relations with the Korean peninsula.186 
Concerning the Korean peninsula, extending the horizon by allowing more time 
for both reunification and peaceful cooperation will provide a stabilizing effect on 
Japanese-Korean relations.  As demonstrated in Chapter IV, both halves of the Korean 
peninsula are concerned about Japan assuming a greater responsibility for regional 
security affairs.  Therefore, as Japan proceeds down the path toward military 
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“normalization,” the regional tensions that may develop in response would likely 
spillover into the Six-Party Talks forum, possibly miring a constructive dialogue in 
nationalistic political banter and further de-legitimizing the U.S. position.  Mistrust of the 
U.S. position in the Six-Party Talks will increase because, in the absence of direct U.S. 
protest, the other actors in the region will view Washington’s silence as an endorsement 
of Japanese remilitarization.  This deepening adversarial relationship that would develop 
between the United States and Japan on one side and the two Koreas and China on the 
other would be detrimental to U.S. national interest and its attempts to stop nuclear 
proliferation originating from the Korean peninsula. 
Finally, establishing a declaratory policy concerning Article 9’s revision will ease 
tensions over Japan’s perceived rush to remilitarize by increasing transparency in this 
challenge to a post-war security taboo.  In large part, regional fears of remilitarization 
have been exacerbated by Prime Minister Koizumi’s nationalistic actions and the 
stagnation of the Japanese economy.  The countries of the region have not forgotten the 
last time that the combination of economic downturn and growing popular nationalism 
were combined in Japan, which led to World War II.  Increasing the horizon in this 
situation has two key stabilizing effects.  First, it separates the revision of Article 9 from 
the current LDP regime.  This is important because the domestic political party backlash 
against the LDP’s draft constitution proposal—released in November 2005—did not help 
to reassure Japan’s neighbors of its benign intentions.  In particular, the LDP’s failure to 
gain even the support of its coalition partner, the New Komeito, strips the LDP’s draft of 
much needed legitimacy.  Second, it provides Japan’s Northeast Asian neighbors an 
adequate amount of time to adjust to the concept of their expanding role in the region.  
Thomas Christensen summarizes this point quite succinctly when he says, “given the 
strong popular sentiments in China about Japan and Taiwan and the dangers of 
hypernationalism in the democratization process, it would be best for the region and the 
world if China transited political reform without distractions and jingoism that would 
likely flow from a Sino-Japanese security competition.”187   
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In addition, as discussed above, the same logic can be applied to Korean-Japanese 
relations, but rather than a democratization process, it is instead a course towards 
peaceful reunification that can be derailed by Japanese military expansionism. 
2. Recommendation Two 
The United States should maintain its current force levels in the region leading up 
to the 2022 transition in order to provide continued stability.  As Michael Yahuda lays 
out in his book, The International Politics if the Asia Pacific, American presence in the 
region has “…provided the public goods that underwrite the strategic stability…” in the 
region,188 and, as several analysts have proposed, if the United States reduces its 
presence in the region, the likelihood of a downward security spiral ensuing will 
dramatically increase.189  In addition, the security umbrella that the United States 
provides will continue to encourage the consensus among countries in the region “…that 
economic development should be the overarching national objective.”190  All of the 
aforementioned benefits that come with maintaining current U.S. military force levels in 
the region will also help in the implementation of policy recommendation number one.  
Finally, by using Jennifer Lind’s analysis of Japan’s tendency to “buck-pass” and 
Thomas Christensen’s work on security dilemma theory, one can better understand the 
consequences associated with a U.S. withdrawal from the region. 
As Jennifer Lind has established, Japan has subscribed to a policy of buck-passing 
onto the United States, when possible.191  She states the foundational tenant is that 
“buck-passers recognize the need to balance against a threat, but they do as little of the 
required balancing as possible by relying on the efforts of others.”192  Commensurate 
with this theory, as the ability to buck pass erodes, one should observe that the buck-
passer increases their capabilities in order to fill the gap.  Specifically, in the case of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance—at times when relative U.S. protection declines—Lind shows that 
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there has been an increase in military force to compensate for the loss.193  She cites that, 
in the 1970s—with a growing Soviet East Fleet and downsizing American presence—this 
is exactly what happened.  In addition, despite the end of the Cold War, there continues 
to be numerous threats that have forced Japan to persist with its military build-up.  Based 
on this theoretical foundation, one could surmise that the United States can dramatically 
influence Japanese remilitarization simply through its presence in the region.  Therefore,  
if the United States conducts force reductions, Japan’s most likely response will be to 
expand its military capabilities.  This increase in military capabilities, even if it is 
intended as purely defensive in nature, will in turn produce a security dilemma between 
Japan and its neighbors.  Theoretically, a security dilemma is created when in “…an 
uncertain and anarchic international system, mistrust between two or more potential 
adversaries can lead each side to take precautionary and defensively motivated measures 
that are perceived as offensive threats.”194  During this crucial transition period, it is 
essential that the United States remain firmly engaged in the region in order to serve as 
the arbiter who can, and must, “ameliorate security dilemmas and prevent spirals of 
tension” in Northeast Asia.195  In contrast to the current U.S. effort to push Japan toward 
assuming a greater amount of the “burden” for regional security, Washington instead 
should accept Tokyo’s “buck-passing” during the period leading up to 2022.  Allowing 
Japan to buck-pass through this period will ease regional fears of a rapidly emerging 
remilitarized Japan and will remove the pressure from Tokyo to quickly reform Article 9 
in order to meet its security needs.  Overall, the execution of policy recommendation 
number two is essential to the successful implementation of recommendation number 
one. 
3. Recommendation Three 
The United States should continue to pursue more equitable burden sharing in the 
U.S.-Japan security alliance.  However, until 2022, Washington should focus on Japan’s 
ability to project “soft power.”  Japan’s “soft power” can serve in a complementary role 
to American “hard power” and would be more amenable to both its populace and its 
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regional neighbors.196  “What is soft power?  It is the ability to get what you want 
through attraction rather than coercion or payments.  It arises from the attractiveness of a 
country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”197  As has been demonstrated 
throughout this thesis, an increase in Japanese use of “hard power” in the current 
international and regional security environment will have the likely effect of instigating 
downward security spirals in Northeast Asia.  By instead focusing on Japan’s 
comparative advantage in projecting “soft power,” the United States can achieve a more 
holistic security alliance in Northeast Asia.  As Tsuneo Akaha states “…a country that 
has enormous hard economic and military power may undercut its soft power by adopting 
coercive policies toward others.”198  With the ongoing U.S. operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the U.S. ability to project adequate “soft power” has diminished.  Therefore, 
an equitable integration of the “soft power” capabilities of Japan would effectively serve 
both the interests of the Japanese people and American politicians, while at the same time 
reducing the potential backlash associated with an increasing Japanese role in world 
affairs through the use of “hard power.”  In addition, by focusing on Japan’s ability to 
project “soft power,” Washington will more likely achieve success in persuading Tokyo 
to take a longer road to Article 9 revision. 
Specifically, due to the horrific events of September 11, 2001, Washington has 
increasingly turned to the use of “hard power” to prosecute the Global War on Terror and 
to overthrow the government of Iraq.  As Joshua Kurlantzick surmises in his article “The 
Decline of American Soft Power,” “the evidence of America’s declining attractiveness is 
wide, with surveys from every part of the world showing diminished reputation….a 
March 2005 poll by BBC of 22 nations across several continents found that nearly all 
believed China plays a more positive role in the world than the United States.”199  This 
poll points to the importance of Japan maintaining its economic, cultural, and 
environmental “soft power” in order to better complement the U.S.-Japan alliance.  There                                                  
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are very few, if any, who would question American “hard power” dominance but, with 
the globalization of economies, media, and information, the ability to convey “soft 
power” is increasingly as important.  Thus, in the current security environment where the 
United States will find itself militarily engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and possibly North 
Korea or Iran for the foreseeable future, it is important that Washington look to its close 
allies to assist in favorably influencing the international environment.  To this end, 
“Japan has more potential soft power resources than any other Asian country.”200  
Whether it is the projection of economic power through ODA (overseas development 
assistance), or influential power through the popularity and prevalence of pop and 
traditional culture, Japan’s ability to project “soft power” can serve American national 
interests by producing a holistic power projection capability.  Further, if the United States 
draws Japan more closely into a “hard power” relationship, this association will 
negatively impact Tokyo’s legitimacy as a center of “soft power” influence.  In the words 
of Eiichi Katahara, “I argue that Japan should play a greater international role as a ‘global 
civilian power’….Japan’s concept of comprehensive security, with Article 9 of the 
Constitution and the United States-Japan alliance as its basic ingredients, remains 
effective in the post-Cold War world.”201  Therefore, by encouraging Japan to hold off 
revision of Article 9 until the 75th anniversary of the document adoption 
(recommendation number one), and maintaining its force presence in the region leading 
up to this transition (recommendation number two), not only will the United States help 
to ease tensions in Northeast Asia by increasing transparency, but it will also serve its 
own interest by fortifying a collaborative “hard and soft power” relationship with its most 
important ally. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Most analysts would agree that Northeast Asia is one of the most important 
regions in the world to U.S. strategic interests today.  Due to this fact, it is of the utmost 
significance that the military “normalization” of Japan goes as smoothly and as quietly as 
possible.  Over the last sixty years, the Renunciation of War clause in the United States 
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brokered Japanese constitution has provided reassurance to Japan’s neighbors that the 
aggression that they experienced in the first half of the 20th century would not happen 
again.  Nevertheless, as time has passed, there has been a growing desire by the people of 
Japan to resume its “rightful status as a normal nation.”202  As I have discussed in 
Chapter II of this thesis, there is a great debate within Japan concerning what 
“normalization” would mean for Article 9 and the Self Defense Force.  However, as 
demonstrated in Chapters III and IV, it is certain that Japan’s regional neighbors wait 
apprehensively to see what the result of the debate will be.  Nevertheless, due to the 
current ad hoc nature of the reform movement and the lack of transparency involved, 
Japan’s Northeast Asian neighbors have or are prepared to oppose, balance, divide, or 
coerce in order to influence Japan not to cross what is seen as a “demarcation line” 
between amenable neighbor and regional aggressor.  As Mayumi Itoh states, “Japan will 
have to make every effort to convince its Asian neighbors, deeply wary of Japanese 
remilitarization, that making the SDF explicitly constitutional does not at all mean that 
Japan will again become an aggressor.”203  To accomplish this task, the United States 
should:  1) encourage Japan to delay revision of Article 9 until the 75th anniversary of the 
document’s enactment (3 May 2022); 2) maintain its current force level in the region; and 
3) better utilize within the U.S.-Japan security alliance the latter’s ability to project “soft 
power.”  By executing all three recommendations together, there is a greater likelihood 
that Washington’s policies will be able to encourage the Japanese slowly to precede 
towards revising Article 9.  Finally, the adoption of these policies will not cure all of the 
ailments of Northeast Asia that are perpetuating the possibility of a security dilemma.    
However, they will certainly have a stabilizing effect on this dynamic region over the 
next two decades.  
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